Truth: The Identity Theory
Hornsby (Jennifer)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (ISSN 0066-7374), volume 97, pp 1-24
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The paper promotes "the identity theory of truth". It is argued that this theory: 1) treats truth as a sui generis norm; 2) lets us shun correspondence theories; 3) leaves us well placed to make out or title to commonsense realism. It is shown that those advocates of a minimal theory of truth who say distinctively and genuinely deflationary things about truth deny us our title to commonsense realism.


See "Sher (Gila) - Introduction to and Commentary on Jennifer Hornsby’s ‘Truth: The Identity Theory’" for commentary

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