Spinoza's Monism
Charlton (William)
Source: Philosophical Review 90.4, Oct. 1981, pp. 503-529
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The paper examines Ethics i.1-14, Especially the proofs in i.4-7 And i.8. Sch. 2. Spinoza, it is argued, starts with a traditional concept of substance, not one for which his monism is trivially true; his demonstrations involve
    … (1) an equivocation on ways in which differences between things are conceivable,
    … (2) an application of the scholastic doctrine that matter is the principle of individuation1
    … (3) a confusion of formal and efficient causes, anticipated by Descartes, which still haunts discussions of causation2.

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