Survival and Identity
Lewis (David)
Source: Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 1: Ontology, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

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Oxford Scholarship Online

  1. Prompted by Derek Parfit's early work on personal identity, Lewis advances the view that persons are best regarded as suitably related aggregates of person-stages. Parfit argues that what matters1 in survival is either identity or mental continuity and connectedness; that the two cannot both be what matters2 in survival (because the former is a one-one relation and does not admit of degree, whereas the latter can admit of degree and may be a one-many or many-one relation); and that what matters3 in survival is not identity.
  2. Contra Parfit, Lewis contends that the opposition is a false one, since it obscures the fact that mental continuity and connectedness is a relation between two person-stages (i.e., time-slices of continuant persons), whereas identity is a relation between temporally extended continuant persons with stages at different times.
  3. The postscript includes both Lewis’ rejoinder to Parfit's objections, as well as a further defense of person-stages.

Comment:
  1. Photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 09 (L)";
  2. Also in:-
  3. For Notes, see "Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis, “Survival and Identity”".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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