An Argument for the Identity Theory
Lewis (David)
Source: Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 2: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 7
Paper - Abstract

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  1. Lewis offers a functionalist argument for the type-type psychophysical identity theory, according to which, as a matter of fact, mental experiences are type-identical with certain neuro-chemical brain states.
  2. Lewis summarizes his argument as follows:
      "The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists1 believe causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristics of experience, they must be the experiences.
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