Mad Pain and Martian Pain
Lewis (David)
Source: Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 2: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 9
Paper - Abstract

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  1. Lewis invites us to consider two ostensible challenges to any materialist1 theory of the mind.
    • The madman feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its characteristic causes and effects;
    • the Martian also feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization.
  2. Lewis argues that his functionalist theory is adequate to meet the challenges presented by both cases.
  3. In the postscript, Lewis considers how advocates of phenomenal qualia respond to the functionalist account he defends; in particular, he responds to Frank Jackson's 'knowledge argument'.

Comment:

Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind".

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