All the Difference in the World
Crane (Tim)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly 41.162, Jan. 1991, pp. 1-25
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    The 'twin earth' arguments of Putnam and Burge are generally supposed to establish that certain intentional states have 'broad contents', 'narrow contents', or some combination thereof. This paper disputes the distinction between broad and narrow content. The twin earth arguments only establish their conclusions if certain implausible assumptions are made about natural kinds1 and the relation between thought and language. Once these assumptions are discarded, it is clear that the contents of intentional states can be shared by 'twins2' and yet have truth-conditions: so they are neither broad nor narrow.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - March 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page