|Source: Journal of Philosophy 72.5, Mar. 1975, pp. 113-131|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Notes Citing this Paper||Link to Latest Write-Up Note|
Philosophers Index Abstract
Since nelson goodman's 1946 paper, it has been almost universally supposed that the inductive rule: certain fs being g supports other fs being g, needs to be restricted to "projectible" predicates and hypotheses. I argue against this view, and suggest three sources of it: (1) a tendency to conflate three different ways of defining 'grue'; (2) a lack of precision about just how, in detail, the 'grue' paradox is supposed to arise; and (3) a failure to note a counterfactual condition which governs the vast majority of our applications of the sr.
For a précis, see the Note1.
Write-up2 (as at 01/08/2017 13:56:38): Jackson - Grue
This note provides my detailed review of "Jackson (Frank) - Grue".
Currently, this write-up is only available as a PDF. For a précis, click File Note (PDF). It is my intention to convert this to Note format in due course.
→ Further details to be supplied3.
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