Grue
Jackson (Frank)
Source: Journal of Philosophy 72.5, Mar. 1975, pp. 113-131
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperLink to Latest Write-Up Note


Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Since Nelson Goodman's 1946 paper, it has been almost universally supposed that the inductive rule: certain fs being g supports other fs being g, needs to be restricted to "projectible" predicates and hypotheses.
  2. I argue against this view, and suggest three sources of it:
    1. a tendency to conflate three different ways of defining 'grue';
    2. a lack of precision about just how, in detail, the 'grue' paradox is supposed to arise; and
    3. a failure to note a counterfactual condition which governs the vast majority of our applications of the SR1.

Comment:

For a précis, see the Note2.


Write-up3 (as at 01/08/2017 13:56:38): Jackson - Grue

This note provides my detailed review of "Jackson (Frank) - Grue".

Currently, this write-up is only available as a PDF. For a précis, click File Note (PDF). It is my intention to convert this to Note format in due course.

→ Further details to be supplied4.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Straight Rule.

Footnote 3:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (01/08/2017 13:56:38).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - December 2017. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page