Human Beings
Johnston (Mark)
Source: Journal of Philosophy, Volume 84, Issue 2 (Feb 1987), 59-83
Paper - Abstract

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Also in "Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings)".

Write-up3 (as at 20/04/2018 23:25:26): Johnston - Human Beings

This write-up is an analysis and review of "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings". Note that Johnston has updated his views of 1987 with "Johnston (Mark) - 'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal" published in 2007.

  1. Introduction
  2. The Conundrum
  3. What Kind of Locus of Mental Life?
  4. Human Organisms and Human Beings
  5. The Conundrum Again

Notes & Annotations
  1. Introduction4
    1. A question worth asking is “What is it that we are?”, but this can easily stray into desiccation.
    2. Philosophy needs to be precise without being desiccating. Avoid the analytic paradigm of death by thought experiment, with competing accounts of the necessary and sufficient conditions for Personal Identity evaluated by how well they compare with intuitions derived from the TEs5.
    3. Compare Gettier cases in Epistemology. The paradigm is somewhat dry, but works well because we’re analysing the relations between concepts – and concepts that are agreed upon.
    4. But the situation isn’t as clear-cut when we come to people. Mental or physical continuity might be evidence for personal survival, but is not part of its meaning. We’re not just dealing with relations between concepts.
    5. Reliance on intuitive reactions to puzzle cases would be justified as an approach to personal identity only if two conditions are satisfied:-
      • Reductionist Requirement6: our concept of “same person7” must be capable of being grasped in non-circular terms of necessary and sufficient conditions based on continuity and dependence relations.
      • No Overgeneralisation Requirement : responses to the puzzle cases are to be based on the above, not on overgeneralisations8 from normal cases or from religious (or secular) preconceptions.
    6. But, empirically, there is no universally-accepted concept of what people are; so, the concept is unspecific and will give the “method of cases” problems. The topic of Personal Identity will address a dry generalisation, as against any of the interesting specific alternative views of what a person might be that have guided practical life.
    7. The dominant view is that we (people) are minds, maybe essentially embodied, but not dependent for our survival on any particular body or brain.
    8. This is Parfit’s wide psychological reductionism, hereafter WPR. See "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be", Section 78, pp. 207-8.
      • Psychological Reductionism: claims of personal identity are solved by the holding of relations of psychological continuity9, the ancestral of psychological connectedness10.
      • Wide: this adjective is applied because – it is held – mental continuity and connectedness can constitute personal identity even in the absence of its normal cause – such as the persistence of a particular human body or brain (which are the usual, but contingent) causes.
    9. Supporters of this view are:-
      1. "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity",
      2. "Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul", and
      3. "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account".
    10. With respect to Shoemaker, Johnston claims that "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity" had some sympathy with the view that bodily continuity is constitutive of PID, but that he allowed the bodily criterion to be overridden by the memory criterion in exceptional cases. However, he’s decisively abandoned the bodily criterion by the time of "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts".
    11. Johnston notes that the “most notable” opponents of WPR (what he calls “the dominant view”) are:-
      1. Bernard Williams:-
      2. Wiggins11: "Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)".
    12. The WPR is usually defended using the intuition that we could find ourselves inhabiting a new body, as confirmed by others noting our re-housed psychological traits. Rather tendentiously, Johnston sees this intuition as being “wrung12” from one of three TEs:-
      1. Locke’s13 Prince and Cobbler: apparent body-swapping. See Quinton.
      2. Teletransportation14:
      3. Brain-State Transfer17:
    13. The “body-changing intuition” generated by these “fantastic” cases is supposed to support the claim that mental continuity and connectedness – however caused – are jointly18 sufficient for personal identity. As regards their necessity, it’s pointed out that in their absence, we wouldn’t be inclined to think these processes identity-preserving19.
    14. So, orthodoxy consists in a combination of the method of cases and WPR. Johnston repeats his opening accusation that orthodoxy is boring, and wants to challenge both the method and WPR.
    15. Johnston wants to give up the reductionist20 requirement that statements about PID are reducible to statements about connectivity and connectedness21. Instead, rather than being constitutive of PID, these just provide evidence for PID, and the more unusual the TE, the less evidence they provide – hence reducing the value of cases – because the usual evidential connections are severed.
    16. This means he adopts what Parfit calls a Further-fact view. The truth-makers of PID-statements differ from those related to psychological – and physical – continuity and connectedness.
    17. Johnston stresses in a footnote that:-
      1. This paper does not in any way suggest – as Parfit says – that we are “separately existing” entities distinct from human brains and bodies. +RHumanBeingsR+
      2. Instead, Johnston will argue that
        1. We22 are23 Human Beings24”, and that
        2. “Human Beings are constituted by human bodies25”.
      3. Further, this paper “can be read as” an extended refutation of Parfit’s claim (in the previously-cited "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be", Section 79, p. 216) that appeal to “further-facts” implies separately-existing entities.
      4. Parfit relies on this assumption for his revisionary ethics in Part Three of "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons", and – without it – his revisionary programme is “broken backed”.
      5. Additionally, we can allow that PID might be indeterminate26 in some puzzle cases without accepting his revisionism.
      6. We’re referred to "Johnston (Mark) - Reasons and Reductionism" for an elaboration.
    18. So, with what does Johnston replace the method of cases? His suggestion is that we take seriously the methods whereby we re-identify one another over time. If any theory fails to give the answers these commonplace methods do, it should be rejected. Thus, we should “automatically rule out” the bare-locus view27 (to be discussed in his Section II), and any other theory that makes our routine practice of re-identification “extremely problematical”.
    19. If multiple theories survive the above cull, we can then – as a secondary measure – resort to the method of cases and compare our intuitions against the theories’ pronouncements.
    20. However, our intuitions can be defeated if one of the following applies:-
      1. They can be shown to be overgeneralisations28 from the ordinary cases,
      2. They can be shown to be due to some distorting influence, or
      3. They are outweighed by other judgements we have reason to respect.
    21. We will make more of cases where intuitions conflict, and look for explanations of why this might be so. Sometimes these explanations will discredit the intuitions, sometimes not.
    22. Johnston allows that we might still be left with multiple surviving theories – a genuine indeterminacy29 – which theory of PID should “articulate”.
    23. He now articulates his own view, which he will argue in this paper falls out of his method:-
      1. We are Human Beings30, as “somewhat stipulatively31” defined by Johnston himself,
      2. Human Beings are necessarily normally32 constituted by human organisms33,
      3. Our persistence conditions differ from those of our constituting organisms only because a Human Being continues to exist34 if his mind does.
      4. So, if a Human Being were reduced to a mere brain, that Human Being would continue to exist as long as that brain supports that Human Being’s mental life.
      5. In such circumstance, the human organism would no longer exist, while the Human Being would plausibly do so.
      6. But, no Human Being could survive teletransportation or similar cases of complete body transfer35.
    24. This is in contrast to the dominant view that considers us to be minds whose particular36 embodiment is contingent.
    25. Johnston has a footnote37 to the effect that he’s talking about our actual concept of PID.
      • It could be the case that the concept gets modified in a culture in which teletransportation is routine so that “they” – “acculturated human animals” – would be said to survive teletransportation.
      • To avoid complications, this is set aside in the present paper, but the main claim of the paper is that there’s no reason to suppose our present concepts would allow us to survive.
      • Johnston describes the “survival option” as a form of relativism about PID38.
      • This would mean that – while we would remain of the kind39 Human Being – this would then no longer be a substance40 kind, in that it would no longer fix what changes we could survive.
      • However, because this conceptual change is unlikely to happen, we can treat the kind Human Being “as if” it were a substance kind and “as if” it determined our essence.
    26. In the next section, Johnston will introduce a well-known conundrum as a test case of his alternative method. He thinks it will attack both aspects of the orthodox position – the method of cases and the dominant view. He thinks it will become evident that the dominant view depends on the puzzle cases’ systematically distorting influences on our intuitions.
  2. The Conundrum
    1. Johnston takes the conundrum from "Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future", but presents it in its own way.
      1. We’re to suppose a machine exists that produces the same effects as a brain transplant. It is capable of recording “dispositional and occurrent mentality” from one brain and adjusting a second brain with this information.
      2. So, two patients – A & B – can “swap minds”.
      3. However, from the perspective of A – we are to suppose – it is as if he has “swapped bodies”.
      4. So, if A is asked to choose in a self-interested way who should receive pain after the transfer – he would (as the case is presented) choose A-body.
      5. Many would agree with this assessment, because41 the machine seems to produce the same effect as a brain transplant42.
    2. But consider an alternative
      1. A is to imagine he has some illness and that a very painful surgical procedure – for which there is no anaesthetic – has a small chance of curing it.
      2. The surgeon suggests that this can be circumvented by using a machine to
        1. record A’s mind, then
        2. scramble his brain so that it has some different psychology, then
        3. restore his psychology as before.
      3. Most of us would intuit that the pain would be A’s, despite the psychological manipulation, which is just a further assault.
      4. Johnston appeals to Williams43 to the effect that psychological continuity is not required for pain-ownership.
    3. Now, these two scenarios are just the same thing – though in the second one B is left out of the equation: but how – Johnston claims – can B’s experiences have anything to do with A’s?
    4. There are two lessons to draw:-
      1. The second presentation counts against the dominant view, and
      2. We have a conflict of intuitions – does or doesn’t A “swap bodies”? This uncertainty threatens the method of cases.
    5. We’re referred to Nozick’s then recent44 Closest Continuer45 theory which promises to rescue the method of cases and only make a minor modification to the dominant view. As expounded by Johnston:-
      1. The closest continuer theory is a schema because the factors to be weighed – and the strength of the weightings – in determining which continuer is “closest” vary with the kind of continuant.
      2. Nozick claims that our intuitions about PID conform to this schema, whereby the closest continuant is the persisting individual.
      3. This explains – according to Nozick – our responses to the two presentations of Williams’s TE:-
        1. The intuition behind the second presentation shows that, for persons, bodily continuity can make up sufficient continuity even in the absence of psychological continuity. That’s why we think A will feel the pain.
        2. That behind the first presentation shows that when bodily and psychological continuity diverge, we give more weight to psychological. This explains – when we hear of the adventures of B, we agree that A and B have “swapped bodies”.
        3. The two intuitions are consistent – according to Nozick – because the first presentation provides – in B – a better continuer for A than is provided in the second. This is why mentioning B and his brain is relevant.
        4. Only a modification46 to the dominant view is required. Psychological continuity can be – on its own – sufficient for personal identity and – in the absence of bodily continuity – is necessary.
    6. This would be an OK response to the conundrum if it could be shown that our intuitions in general follow the closest-continuer schema as interpreted by the modified dominant view. But – Johnston argues – they don’t.
      1. Johnston’s first challenge is to consider carefully what we are to say in the case where the machine copies A’s psychology to patients B-body and, 10 minutes later) to C-body, and A-body dies.
      2. Both B-body and C-body are sufficiently close psychologically to be continuers of A – and hence to be A – but we’re to suppose C-body is in fact a much better continuer47, and this is sufficient to compensate for the extra 10-minute delay – the copying time – in producing C.
      3. But – a twist – once B-body has been “produced” – but before C-body has been “completed” – B-body thinks to himself “I didn’t just come into existence, but am A”, but realises that if he doesn’t act now, C-body will be completed and will be A, rather than he himself.
      4. So, B-body terminates C-body’s copy-process. And now – according to the closest-continuer theory – B-body has made it true that he is A.
    7. All this – Johnston claims – is problematical:-
      1. Our intuition is that facts are made true only by what has happened up to the time they are made, not by future events48.
      2. So, B-body’s statement “I am A, …” is true (or false) at the point he first makes it – which is before he decides to terminate the production of C-body. Its truth-value49 cannot be affected by subsequent events.
      3. So, to the extent that we are in thrall to the above intuition, we will not be convinced that the Closest-Continuer theory resolves this conundrum even if a form of the Closest-Continuer theory were to be adopted (for persons) for other reasons.
    8. Johnston also thinks that the Closest-Continuer theory cannot explain the second presentation of Williams’s conundrum unless it is presented one-sidedly, because as soon as it’s presented two-sidedly, it reverts to the body-swapping of the first presentation. But – Johnston claims – we can easily understand the stipulation50 – in the second telling – that the psychological change happens to A (and to B) without body-swapping.
    9. At this point, Johnston abandons Nozick51, and considers a “minimal response” to Williams’s conundrum, which will be elaborated in subsequent sections:-
      1. A person is a locus of mental life52, which
      2. Typically exhibits psychological continuity by which it can be traced, but
      3. Need not do so, and can exhibit psychological discontinuity of the most radical sort, and
      4. We must not think of psychological continuity as sufficient for our survival.
    10. This can accommodate both presentations of Williams’s conundrum. It is reasonable to trace a locus of mental life in terms of psychological continuity, but it might be the case that this general practice leads us astray in particular cases.
    11. This leads us to consider our reaction to the second presentation of the conundrum as prima facie evidence against the wide psychological view, without taking our reaction to the first presentation as suggesting that psychological continuity – however secured – is always sufficient.
    12. We now need to answer the question “what kind of locus of mental life are we?”, and this is a question that has to be answered by any theorist of PID, whether or not he seeks to reduce PID to continuity of whatever sort.
  3. What Kind of Locus of Mental Life?
    1. The method of cases – in particular, Williams’s conundrum – can be made to show that neither bodily nor psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity.
      1. This points towards a “bare-locus of mental life” view of personal identity.
      2. However, such a view is ruled out by Johnston’s earlier considerations53.
      3. In a footnote:-
        • We’re referred to "Madell (Geoffrey) - The Identity of the Self", esp. pp. 117-140 (ie. Sections 2-4 of "Madell (Geoffrey) - Personal Identity Through Time"),
        • However, despite requiring neither mental or physical continuity for PID, Madell may not hold the bare-locus view as he holds the view that “people” are not objective entities at all, but entirely subjective.
        • For this view54 we’re referred to "Nagel (Thomas) - Subjective and Objective" to explain what is intended by “subjective”.
        • Johnston opines that the idea of ourselves as subjective is a seductive55 Kantian Idea of Reason, which arises because the only idea of ourselves that reflective “I”-thoughts appear to underwrite is an unspecific conception of ourselves as a locus of reflective mental life.
        • We’re referred on to Johnston’s FN1656.
    2. Johnston considers cases where we think we can imagine – from the inside – various vicissitudes happening to us such as departing from a human body or even a human personality:-
      1. For instance Kafka’s “beetle-man” in Metamorphosis57 in "Kafka (Franz), Pasley (Malcolm) - Metamorphosis and Other Stories".
      2. Johnston doesn’t think there’s anything internally incoherent about such imaginings.
      3. Nor does he think they are due to some religious (or secular) conception of people that the imaginer has picked up.
      4. They are consistent with our concept of a person and as such are not idle, but – given the method of cases – can be used to flesh out our concept and so indicate the correct theory of PID.
    3. But, Johnston insists, the imaginings are idle for all that, and if this can be shown, then our concept of person as revealed by the puzzle cases is shown to be too unspecific to be of interest, and to mislead us in the cases themselves.
      1. Treating the person as a locus of (reflective) mental life allows the person to survive any conceivable vicissitude.
      2. The presence of imagined bodily or mental continuities provides evidence for survival in the puzzle cases by a harmless extension of our practice in normal cases.
      3. But, in their absence there’s no constraint and we end up with the bare locus view.
    4. So, how are we to show that imaginings that detach us for the human beings we appear to be are idle without begging the question against the bare locus view?
      1. Johnston repeats his earlier claim that a constraint on any theory of PID is that it allows us to reconstruct our everyday practices of unproblematic re-identification of people over time – and that the bare-locus theory flouts this constraint.
      2. He imagines an extreme case consistent with the bare-locus view – that of one’s body turning to stone. If I could survive this, what is my relation to my body? It is contingent58 – and it cannot be that I am identical with or necessarily constituted by my living body.
      3. So, at best, there would need to be some actual but contingent causal channel whereby I – the bare locus – receive information from – and direct changes in – my body.
      4. But Johnston considers what would be said if petrification happened during a dreamless sleep when there’s an interruption to the mental life of the subject – there’s nothing in the specification to forbid this state and – in any case – this would make the bare-locus view at odds with the presumed facts of PID, where we routinely think of ourselves as surviving periods of unconsciousness.
      5. In this “twist” the bare-locus isn’t – at the moment of petrification – actually communicating with or controlling its body59 at all.
      6. Johnston now claims there are epistemological difficulties.
        1. Our evidence that a person is persisting through a dreamless sleep60 is based on their continued bodily life.
        2. Also – we know P on condition (inter alia) that our evidence converges on P as opposed to relevant alternatives to P.
        3. But, on the bare-locus view, we can’t rule out the possibility that various distinct loci have been serially associated with the sleeping body, so we don’t know who we’ve been sleeping with!
      7. It won’t do to object that multiple loci can be ruled out by an appeal to the numerically simplest explanation of the observed bodily continuity.
        1. No-one claims to know how bare loci “work”.
        2. No hypothesis would explain how a bare locus can control a body in the absence of a mental life.
        3. Indeed, the simplest explanation of what happens in dreamless sleep would be that the bare locus had wandered off.
      8. Suppose there were an empirical theory of the ways of bare loci:-
        1. Maybe obtained from introspection, the observation of others, or even by revelation, and
        2. We had the best case scenario where bare loci do not migrate or rotate during periods of unconsciousness.
        3. This – an empirical61 theory that fits human experience – is what any substance dualist should take himself as offering.
        4. Then – just maybe – one might rule out the alternatives and so know that a single person is associated over time with a sleeping or otherwise unconscious body.
        5. Johnston has a footnote on Dualism:-
      9. But our ordinary claims to know that our unconscious friends are where their bodies are have nothing to do with any theory that rules out any number of bare loci becoming associated with their bodies. We never consider any such thing – and – philosophical scepticism aside – we do have this knowledge, which we would not have were the bare-locus theory correct.
      10. We can’t wriggle out of this conclusion on the grounds that – if the bare-locus theory were better known – people would consider it. Johnston gives an example64.
        1. Two of us see someone (“Mary”) steal a book, but only I now that the thief has a twin sister and the two dress alike.
        2. It is in fact Mary, as I believe, but am not in a position to know – because I cannot rule out a relevant alterative.
        3. My friend can’t know either. Indeed, it would be absurd that he could know – yet I not – when I know more of the relevant facts than he does.
      11. For similar examples, see:-
        "Goldman (Alvin) - Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", and
        "Swain (Marshall) - Reasons, Causes, and Knowledge".
      12. Hence, the bare-locus view fails, and with it various others, such as Richard Swinburne’s substance dualism as expounded in
        "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory", and
        "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity".
        This is so even if the substance dualist claims that some mental features are permanent or essential properties. Using a locus of mental life just isn’t how we trace unconscious people.
    5. So, where are we?
      1. The bare-locus view is straightforwardly supported by the method of cases.
      2. To the extent that we find this view absurd, we should be suspicious of the method.
      3. Our response to the puzzle cases reifies our unspecific concept of ourselves as some or other sort of locus of mental life.
        1. We’re referred to Kant in the promised +RFN16R+ FN16. The passage – given in full below65 – is from B42766.
        2. "I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual experience, and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am confusing a possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject."
    6. So, what is the correct conception of ourselves and how should we argue for it?
  4. Human Organisms and Human Beings
    1. So, we change our approach, and start from a biological assumption:-
      1. We start from the presumption that we are organisms – evolved animals of species homo sapiens – the view that places us most comfortably within the naturalistic worldview of scientific common-sense67.
      2. Hence, the locus of mental life we re-identify when re-identify a person over time just is an instance of a biological kind whose typical members exhibit a complex mental life.
      3. What’s wrong with this?
    2. Johnston thinks we must relinquish this position because of the – even then – familiar Brown / Brownson TE in pp. 23-24 of "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self-Knowledge and the Body".
      1. Brown and Robinson have their brains swapped over. Brown-body dies, but “Brownson” – namely Brown’s brain in Robinson’s body – survives to regain consciousness, and shows all the psychological traits consistent with him being Brown.
      2. The standard intuitive response is that Brownson is Brown and that during the operation, Brown survived as a disembodied brain.
      3. Johnston claims the intuition is “robust” because68:-
        1. It remains even if the TE is modified so that Brown’s brainless body – called “Brownless” – is supplied with69 sufficient brain-stem to keep it alive indefinitely, in the absence of any mental life.
        2. Brownless – a badly mutilated human organism – didn’t just come into existence, and so must be the same human organism as Brown.
        3. While Brownson continues Brown’s mental life, he’s not the same human organism as Brown if we insist that human organisms are purely biological kinds, for whom metabolic functions are more important in tracing continuing life than are mental functions.
        4. So, if “human organism” is a purely biological kind, then Brownless – and not Brownson – is the same human organism as Brown.
      4. Hence, if Brown survives as Brownson, then Brown – and others of his kind – cannot be essentially human organisms.
      5. In the promised FN17, Johnston argues that this causes a problem for +RFN17R+ Wiggins in "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance".
        1. Wiggins’s definition of a person70 is: “any animal that is such by its kind to have the biological capacities to enjoy fully the psychological capacities enumerated,”
        2. And from this he deduces (p. 172): “There would be no one real essence of person as such, but every person could still have the real essence of a certain kind of animal. Indirectly this would be the real essence in virtue of which he was a person”.
        3. But, for Johnston, this reasonable suggestion is contradicted by the claim that Brown is Brownson; for, if so, the kind human animal doesn’t capture Brown’s essence71.
        4. Johnston adds that similar remarks apply to the claim in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings" that (human) persons are human organisms.
    3. Now, the predominant intuition that Brownson is Brown is just down to an uncritical reliance on the method of cases and – indeed – to two distorting influences that Johnston will explain later, namely the psychological- and social-continuer effects. What we need is a principled reason consistent with Johnston’s methods.
      → Which are that we should easily be able to trace through time those of our kind.
      1. We typically trace ourselves back in time using experiential memory, and memory itself makes an identity assumption – that the supposed rememberer was indeed the experiencer.
      2. Even the Cartesian sceptic who (temporarily) doubts the existence of the external world takes memory as proof of personal identity72.
      3. But, once we agree that certain conditions of bodily continuity are necessary for PID, the deliverances of memory might only provide evidence for the persistence of minds73 rather than of persons74. How could anything purely mental have any corporeal implications?
      4. Johnston thinks that the solution to the above “difficulty” is to realise that it’s a conceptual truth75 that a person cannot be outlived76 by what was once his own mind.
      5. Talk of a particular mind just is talk of a particular person’s mental functioning.
      6. So, the conviction – and usually the knowledge – that the mind that remembers an experience is the same mind that originally had it is just saying the same thing with “person” substituted for “mind”.
      7. So, if we have evidence for the persistence of a mind, we have evidence for the persistence of a person.
      8. Given the naturalistic view of our mental functioning as the characteristic functioning of our brains, one’s mind will continue on if only one’s brain does.
      9. So – Johnston thinks – we now have an argument for the brain transplant intuition: if our own memories are to give knowledge of our own personal persistence (rather than simply our mental persistence), then – assuming a “mere brain” would preserve our mental life – we would survive as a “mere brain”.
      10. Thus, we have to over-ride the naturalistic feeling that we are human organisms and say instead that we are human beings77.
    4. Having proved to his satisfaction that we are human beings, according to Johnston’s rather obscure definition of the term, he now has to fend off the suggestion that we are in fact human brains78.
      1. We’re referred to the following supporters of the “brain view”:-
        Thomas Nagel, "Are You Your Brain?79," paper delivered to Princeton Philosophy Colloquium and APA Pacific Division, 1984.
        "Mackie (J.L.) - The Transcendental 'I'".
      2. Johnston thinks this view very odd, and has paradoxical consequences that Olson later pointed out in detail – so “I weigh 150 pounds” (when – strictly speaking – if I am my brain, I only weigh 3 pounds) is analogous to a truck-driver saying “I weigh 3 tons”.
      3. However, his focus is on the motivation for entering into paradox in this way.
      4. The motivation – of course – is that the survival of one’s brain is sufficient for one’s survival, and may well be necessary80.
      5. But this does not imply that we are of the kind human brain.
      6. The reason is that the rare occasion in which one of us might survive as a disembodied human brain is in a radically mutilated condition.
      7. This concept of mutilation is important here because we cannot determine the characteristic form and extent of a human being by determining how much mutilation it can undergo. Its characteristic form and extent is exemplified, rather, in its unmutilated81 form.
    5. The bottom line of all this is that rather than being of kind human brain we are of a kind such that we survive if our mental life does – but only as a result of the survival of our organ of mentation.
      1. The kind human being gives primary importance to mental functioning, so names a partly psychological kind.
      2. In contrast, the kind human organism represents a purely biological kind, in which mental functioning has no special persistence-guaranteeing status.
      3. Practically-speaking, the survival of the human organism is a necessary condition for the survival of a human being.
      4. However, there are Shoemaker-cases such that a human being can come to be constituted by a mere brain, and then by a new human organism in which that brain comes to be housed.
      5. But, the survival of that brain is critical – so a human being cannot survive teletransportation and the like.
      6. The fact of causal dependence between mental states pre- and post-teletransportation should not seduce us into thinking these states are states of the same mind.
    6. A human mind is neither
      1. A substance in its own right, nor
      2. A bundle-theorist’s ersatz for such a substance.
    7. Instead, it is just the mode of functioning of a “natural unit” – eg. a human organism or a human brain whose persistence conditions are given in non-mental terms. Talk of the mind is often overly reified talk of an aspect of some minded thing.
    8. Johnston has a footnote that’s helpful in showing what he thinks he’s proved and what he’s left for future work.
      1. Items on the “to do list” are:-
        1. Justification82 of his claim about what a human mind is.
        2. An acceptable account83 of constitution84, persistence85 and kinds86.
      2. He says that all that’s required of kinds for present purposes is that all actual and potential members of a kind share, across time:-
        1. The same persistence conditions, and
        2. The same possible types of constitution.
  5. The Conundrum Again
    1. Johnston’s conclusion is that we are essentially human beings who can survive having our brains tampered with, but cannot switch bodies without a brain transplant. If this is the case, how do we explain Williams’s conundrum? The first presentation of Williams’s TE is therefore misleading. What is going on?
      1. We must be suspicious of intuitions that suggest either psychological or physical continuity is not necessary for survival, as they incline us to the “unspecific locus of mental life” view.
      2. But, in the first presentation of Williams’s TE, this is not the case – we have two continuity options, but psychological continuity wins out over physical. Is this because we’re implicitly committed to the WPV?
      3. Johnston thinks not – but rather that it’s an overgeneralisation from ordinary life.
        1. Johnston defines an excellent continuer of Y as some X whose psychology87 – both occurrent and dispositional – is both very similar to, and evolves out of, that of Y.
        2. In everyday life, one’s death leaves no excellent continuer, and one’s life preserves one unique excellent continuer – namely, oneself.
      4. But if we are essentially human beings, it will be possible to imagine cases in which either:-
        1. A person ceases to be, yet has a unique excellent continuer (teletransportation), or
        2. A person continues to exist, but another person becomes his unique excellent continuer (Williams’s first presentation).
      5. If the cases are described purely in terms of continuities, we may be misled into tracing people using the usual psychological continuity. This is an understandable +ROvergeneralisationR+ overgeneralisation88, which leads us to trace individuals according to the WPC.
      6. Johnston describes this tendency as the psychological continuer effect.
    2. But this can only be part of the explanation:-
      1. Why do we not respond to Williams’s first presentation using the usual bodily continuity?
      2. Johnston claims that people can be got to react that way – and usually do – if the case is described after cases that highlight the importance of bodily continuity.
      3. But, when Johnston presented the case, it was described in a way that assimilated it to the brain-transplant case – alleging that it produced the same psychological effects without the surgical messiness – which allows the psychological continuer effect to operate.
      4. Because our responses are inconsistent, it shows we’re not suited to making judgements about PID in such bizarre cases, and just opt for a partial extension of our ordinary practice of re-identification.
    3. But, some people do react to Williams’s first presentation in the “body swapping” sense even when there are no cases mentioned to which it might be assimilated, at least provided there is some bodily similarity to go with the psychological continuity. Why is this so? Johnston can think of two reasons:-
      1. We expect people – at least in the short term – to continue to fulfil a complex of social roles.
        1. PID typically guarantees that one has a unique social continuer.
        2. This is fulfilled – especially when the bodies involved are alike – in Williams’s first presentation.
        3. So, we can fixate on the practical concomitants of PID.
        4. Thus – in addition to the psychological continuer effect – we have the social continuer effect.
        5. This is a distorting influence, as we are not essentially occupants of a complex of social roles89.
        6. So, the WPV is parasitic on these two effects – and gives roughly the right persistence conditions for personas90 - but persons antedate, outlive and may sometimes be outlived by91, their personas.
      2. We have an inchoate conception of ourselves as souls92, that is – “primarily psychological and not essentially physical loci of reflective mental life”.
        1. The reason for this – Johnston thinks – is that
          • “there is such a thing as the pure or merely determinable93 concept of personal identity, the concept of a persisting person as some or other unspecified kind of persisting locus of reflective mental life,” and
          • “the psychological-continuer effect leads us to trace such loci along lines of psychological continuity in cases in which bodily and psychological continuity come apart.”
        2. Thus, a tendency to trace ourselves as non-physical souls – brought on by a pure concept of PID and the psychological continuer effect – survives a transition to a secular worldview – to the embarrassment of those physicalists who espouse the WPV.
    4. In a concluding paragraph:-
      1. Johnston admits that nothing in this paper gives a direct argument against the WPV, but only points out why arguments for it are unconvincing.
      2. We are referred to "Johnston (Mark) - Reasons and Reductionism" for more direct arguments. Further pursuit here would be a distraction, because …
      3. The main import of this paper is that the WPV depends on an analytical method94 we have no reason to respect and which in any case leads to the bare locus view.
      4. Hence, he thinks the WPV cannot be rehabilitated, and – indeed – why should it be, given we have a better alternative – that we are human beings.
      5. The advantages of the view that we are human beings are twofold:-
        1. We can locate ourselves in a broadly naturalistic95 conception of the world, and
        2. We find nothing problematic about the way we normally re-identify ourselves and others on the basis of our normal and continuous mental and physical functioning as human organisms96.
      6. There are no real costs in adopting Johnston’s view (he thinks97). Rather, we’re
        1. Freed from imaginative conceits,
        2. Freed from the deliverances of the method of cases,
        3. Shown that the common conception of PID is just the unilluminating – because “merely determinable98” – concept of an unspecified locus of mental life.

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2: So extensive that I may never get the opportunity to review it in detail.

Footnote 3:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (20/04/2018 23:25:26).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 4: Footnote 8:
  • It’s not immediately apparent what Johnston’s stricture is here.
  • Obviously, the pejorative “over-” is to be avoided, but when is it applied? An example would have helped.
  • It is explained somewhat in the last section.
Footnote 11: Johnston says his disagreement with Wiggins is in his FN17.

Footnote 12: I think the intuition – though mistaken – arises naturally from these TEs, and have found it difficult to persuade intelligent non-philosophers from the view that they prove the case for WPR.

Footnote 15: Johnson suggests pp. 119-20, but this is a typo, I think.

Footnote 16: See my Note on Parfit.

Footnote 18:
  • Within this context, this is a good point.
  • We might have connectedness without continuity – say “I” went from prince to frog and then to cobbler – and thereby not so convinced of identity-preservation between prince and cobbler, despite their psychological connectedness.
Footnote 19:
  • Does anyone believe this argument?
  • These are – as Johnston notes – “fantastic” cases where we’re not all convinced that identity is preserved.
  • So, if we don’t believe these causal processes are identity-preserving (as Parfit appears not to do) even when we have psychological connectivity and connectedness then any reluctance so to do in their absence says nothing about their necessity.
  • But it’s true that believers in the PV do think these conditions necessary, but only because they think identity is not preserved in their absence in more mundane cases (amnesia, Alzheimer’s, etc).
Footnote 20: Presumably Johnston – unless he takes the Simple View, doesn’t want to give up on reductionism altogether, only that associated with WPR?

Footnote 21: Johnston doesn’t restrict the C & C to psychology, but presumably that’s what he means.

Footnote 23: Presumably, this is the “is” of identity, rather than of constitution.

Footnote 25:
  • This superficially sounds like Baker’s Constitution View.
  • However, Johnston doesn’t think the human person is separable from the human brain/body as in the case of Baker’s reified FPP.
  • So, despite the identical form of words, he can’t mean the same thing as the (later) Baker. I need to look at what Johnston eventually writes about Baker (if anything) and vice-versa.
Footnote 27: I assume this is something like haecceity.

Footnote 28:
  • It’s still not obvious what Johnston means here.
  • But see later.
Footnote 29: This is not – presumably – “indeterminate identity” – but indeterminacy as to which theory to choose.

Footnote 31:
  • Johnston isn’t stipulating that we are Human Beings – which he can’t do – but stipulating what he means by this term.
  • It is dangerous, however, to take on an existing term as people may not always remember the stipulative definition.
  • Indeed, it’s not clear to me that Johnston himself does so. In what follows I have capitalised “Human Being” to show it’s a term of art, though Johnston himself keeps it lower case.
Footnote 32:
  • This is an odd combination of modal terms.
  • Presumably, the necessity follows from the stipulation and the logic of identity.
  • The “normally” introduces a disjunctive element into our persistence conditions.
  • So, “same organism” will usually do, except when we’re pared down to our brains, when “same brain” does the trick.
Footnote 33:
  • Two issues here:-
    1. What does Johnston mean by “constituted”?
    2. In a previous footnote he claimed we’re constituted by “human bodies” but here by “human organisms”.
  • Maybe the latter point is fine, and not a slip.
  • A human brain is not a “human organism” – Johnston submits – but might be a “human body”.
  • But in that case, “human body” would do for the term describing what we are, and he wouldn’t need to hijack “Human Being”.
  • But – personally – I’d have thought it at least as hard to argue that a disembodied brain is a body as to argue that it is an organism.
  • Maybe there’s more to it than this. Johnston has claimed that we “go on” if our mind does, but hasn’t covered what happens if the “human body” goes on without any mentality. Do we go on? If not, he needs a term distinct from “human body” to describe what we are.
  • Watch this space!
Footnote 34:
  • Does Johnston take this to be self-evident, or does he argue for this?
  • “Mind” is rather a vague concept. We at least need “conscious mind”, but Baker’s FPP seems best.
Footnote 35:
  • What’s this? What’s an “incomplete” body transfer?
  • How does it follow from what he’s just said?
Footnote 36: Johnston highlights “particular”. The view he rejects seems very similar to Baker’s constitution view, which superficially sounds like Johnston’s own.

Footnote 37:
  • This footnote is confusing (to me) and worrying.
  • Survival is a metaphysical issue, while concepts are linguistic.
  • So, how can conceptual change affect real-world survival?
  • As has been rehearsed elsewhere, it’s not a matter of convention whether our FPP would survive teletransportation, though it’s not something we can determine empirically either. It’s a metaphysical issue.
Footnote 38: I don’t know what this means. Is he talking about Relative Identity, or something else?

Footnote 41:
  • But not all agree with the “Brain Transplant Intuition” as Olson calls it.
  • Animalists – officially, at least – think of the brain as “just another organ”.
  • Despite my inclinations towards animalism, I don’t agree with them – but share the BTI, and agree with Johnston on this point.
Footnote 43:
  • This is neither necessary, nor clear.
  • It’s all a bit quick, as it’s central to the question at hand.
Footnote 44: Footnote 46:
  • So, the difference from the dominant view is that psychological continuity isn’t necessary for personal identity where we have physical continuity and no closer psychological continuer (and – presumably – continued sentience).
Footnote 47: Presumably for corporeal rather than psychological reasons.

Footnote 48:
  • This claim is contentious.
  • The claim “this is my last birthday” can be made true by my dying before my next. The argument is over whether it is timelessly true, or whether it has no truth-value until my death occurs, when it becomes true retrospectively.
  • See the discussion of "Aristotle - De Interpretatione, Chapter 9" in this Note.
Footnote 49:
  • I don’t like the way this is going.
  • The issue ought not to be about the truth-values of statements, but the metaphysics of identity.
  • B-body doesn’t think he has just come into existence, but he might be wrong. Similarly, he might think he’s A, but he might be wrong.
  • The critical question is – in the case where the “production” of C-body is not terminated – whether B-body could be A for 10 minutes, and cease to be A thereafter for reasons extrinsic to him.
  • The intuition that rejects this possibility is the real reason for objecting to the Closest-Continuer theory.
Footnote 50:
  • Again, this seems to be the wrong line to take.
  • It might – according the Closest Continuer theory, if this were to be correct – be that the stipulation cannot be made, and that we are confused when we think we understand it.
  • This objection of mine is the same sort of objection I and others make to Descartes’s arguments involving so-called “clear and distinct ideas”. If they are ideas that purport to represent what are – in fact – impossibilities, they cannot be clear and distinct, and so cannot be argued to represent possibilities.
Footnote 51:
  • As remarked in previous footnotes, I don’t think Johnston marshals the strongest arguments against the Closest Continuer theory.
  • In particular, he doesn’t consider the “exact similarity” case, where we have two equally close continuers, and either contradict the logic of identity or deny that either of the candidates are continuers, when either on his own would have done fine.
Footnote 52:
  • An animalist must deny this first premise. I persist as a human animal in a PVS, even though I have nothing that matters to me.
  • My view is that the FPP is “essential” to me, in the sense that without it I have nothing that matters, and that I would persist as long as my FPP does, yet might also persist after it is extinguished – so it is not necessary for my existence.
  • But, because of what I am (a human animal), and how my FPP is realised (by processes in a particular brain), this FPP is not portable in the way envisaged by WPR (or by supporters of the CV).
  • The test case is that of a WBT.
Footnote 53: In the Introduction, on the grounds that such a view makes our re-identification over time “extremely problematical”.

Footnote 54: Presumably not to be confused with Nihilism.

Footnote 55:
  • I’m not clear whether this word should come before or after “Kantian”.
  • All this is obscure to me – but no doubt has something to do with FPPs, so is probably important.
Footnote 58: I have a footnote that suggests that Harold Noonan (or was it Sydney Shoemaker) objected to modal arguments like this in discussions of the statue and the clay.

Footnote 59:
  • I have an old marginal annotation asking whether I’ve got the argument right!
    1. My brain-stem is receiving information and directing my body, but completely unconsciously.
    2. My “bare locus” must be taken by Johnston to exclude unconscious / subconscious mentation – or don’t any of these computations count as cognitive at all?
    3. They aren’t like the pre-conscious computations in (say) vision – they don’t lead to any conscious thoughts or perceptions as all, being completely regulatory.
    4. The “bare locus” is supposed to be one of “mental life” which could – in most cases – be traced by mental continuity – so is presumably only a locus of conscious metal life?
    5. But this would seem to leave out a lot – many of our “eureka” moments can only be explained by subconscious mentation.
  • I’m not sure what I intended by this back in 2006. Maybe I had misunderstood Johnston’s argument. I’m still not sure I understand it.
  • The brain-stem, like the rest of the brain, is part of the body and nothing to do with the bare locus, which has to communicate with it.
  • My question, I think, has to do with the boundaries of the locus of thought. This is described as a “locus of conscious mental life”, so presumably doesn’t include anything that goes on subconsciously.
  • Review this later!
Footnote 60:
  • On the PV, the claim to know that a particular person continues to exist unconscious is defeasible.
  • If that person never regains consciousness, we might say that that person had ceased to exist when he lapsed into unconsciousness.
  • And were he subsequently to regain consciousness – contrary to all expectations – we’d revise our earlier opinion and say he hadn’t ceased to be; that is, unless we allow “gappy existence”.
Footnote 61: But dualists tend to be rationalists rather than empiricists.

Footnote 62: Ie. See "Strawson (Peter) - Persons".

Footnote 63: Footnote 64:
  • The point of this is that – just as ignorance of relevant alternatives doesn’t allow my friend to know – so our ignorance of (supposedly true) bare-locus theories doesn’t enable us to know.
  • So, we wouldn’t know – contrary to Johnston’s common-sense claim that we do, and that any theory that says we don’t must be ruled out.
Footnote 65: Some day I’ll translate it into my own words – I can’t do this faithfully at the moment.

Footnote 66: In "Kant (Immanuel), Kemp Smith (Norman) - Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason".

Footnote 67:
  • Of course, those with supernaturalist inclinations won’t accept this starting point.
  • No doubt Johnston’s response would be that the alternatives involve bare-loci, which he has earlier ruled out.
Footnote 68:
  • At least as I’ve expounded it, Johnston’s argument doesn’t really seem to back up this claim.
  • It needs an explicit argument that our intuition would be that Brown continues as Brownson rather than as Brownless.
  • Most would agree, but the animalists would not.
Footnote 69:
  • Presumably Johnston thinks it doesn’t matter from where the brain-stem comes.
  • But – it might be argued – the regulatory properties of the brain-stem are so important that a disembodied brain-stem might be taken to be a “maximally-mutilated” human organism.
Footnote 70:
  • I agree with Wiggins that “Person” is an honorific rather than a substance kind.
  • Thus, there are indeed no persistence conditions that apply to all and only persons in all possible worlds.
  • I disagree that it is a conceptual truth that all persons are animals – though it may be empirically true
Footnote 71:
  • This may be the most serious objection to Animalism.
  • Since we are animals – for all that – there must be something wrong with the argument!
  • My current thought is that it’s more credible to claim that a disembodied brain is a maximally-mutilated animal than that the brain is “just another organ”.
  • Johnston’s rather quick discussion of Brownless doesn’t take sufficiently seriously the importance of the imported brain-stem.
  • That situation may best be considered as the grafting on of a new body to whoever once owned the brain-stem.
  • But there’s still the issue that it is claimed that the persistence conditions of brains differ from those of animals, and that brains are not organisms.
  • I have my doubts as to the cogency of these objections.
    1. Persistence: Brains are not “masses of matter”, and persist as long as they are alive, just as animals do. They don’t have all the functions of a fully-functional organism, but that’s because they are maximally-mutilated.
    2. Organisms: again, because they are maximally-mutilated, they don’t perform all the self-maintenance functions of an organism – but these functions can be hived off in any case – an organism of “life support” is an organism for all that.
Footnote 72:
  • But, we’ve seen from the teletransportation case that apparent memories can be deceptive.
  • There are other TEs – supposed surgical transplants of memory-traces, quasi-memory, and the like.
  • Where is Johnston going here?
Footnote 73:
  • Are minds the sort of thing that can be individuated?
  • They sound incorporeal, and so can be multiply incorporated.
  • Are they – strictly-speaking – universals rather than particulars?
  • For my thoughts on Minds, Click here for Note.
Footnote 74: So, what – for Johnston – are “persons”? Click here for Note.

Footnote 75:
  1. Standard PV:
    • Holders of the PV think that there are some psychological changes that a person cannot survive.
    • But, if there’s still a mind there after these drastic changes, whose mind is it?
    • Presumably it’s a new person’s – as in “he’s no longer the same person”, taken literally.
    • Do holders of the PV really believe this? If so, the claim to conceptual truth is unchallenged.
  2. Transhumanism:
    • But, the transhumanists think that we – our minds – can be uploaded to a computer.
    • If so, a person might well be outlived by his own mind?
Footnote 76:
  • In what sense are minds “alive”?
  • Isn’t “life” a biological concept?
  • But it may not matter, as all Johnston needs is that a person should not be “survived” by his own mind.
Footnote 79: Footnote 80:
  • Both the necessary and sufficient conditions would be denied by strict animalists.
Footnote 81:
  • I agree completely.
  • For instance, the “we are brains” argument – stopped a bit short – says that we are “really” one-legged, because we all admit that anyone can survive the loss of a leg.
Footnote 82: I agree with this claim, so a detailed justification would be welcome.

Footnote 83:
  • The one I’m particularly interested in is of constitution, as it’s a term variously used.
  • Kinds and persistence are fairly standard ideas.
  • However, the three concepts are closely interlinked.
Footnote 87: Note this bias towards psychology.

Footnote 88:
  • At last we have an explanation of the use “overgeneralisation” hitherto!
  • It seems rather more like a lazy habit of mind, assuming that things are as in the normal case, when they are clearly not.
  • It also fails to put thought into what mental continuities consist in. Just what is it that carries my FPP forward from one moment to another, and which ensures it’s reconstituted after a period of unconsciousness?
Footnote 89:
  • Parfit seems inclined to this view, thinking it’s as good as survival if our projects are carried on by someone else.
Footnote 90:
  • I have a note on Personalities, which – while roughly the same – is not quite the same thing.
Footnote 91: Presumably only in bizarre TEs?

Footnote 93: +RDeterminableR+ Footnote 94: Johnston doesn’t remind us of what this is, but it’s – presumably – the method of cases.

Footnote 95: This might be a disadvantage for those of a super-naturalist inclination.

Footnote 96: I find a slight tension here – in that we trace organisms, despite not being organisms.

Footnote 97: This whole bullet & sub-bullets reflect an unpacking of an unduly complex final sentence.

Footnote 98: See this Footnote.

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