Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities II |
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Lewis (David) |

Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 581-589 |

Paper - Abstract |

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__Author’s Introduction__

- Ernest Adams's thesis about indicative conditionals is that their assertability goes by the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given the antecedent, in very much the same way that assertability normally goes by the subjective probability of truth.
- The thesis is well established; the remaining question is how it may best be explained. The nicest explanation would be that the truth conditions of indicative conditionals are such as to guarantee the equality
- (*)P(A→C) = P(C/A) =df P(CA)/P(A) whenever P(A) is positive.

- In "Lewis (David) - Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities" I argued that this nicest explanation cannot be right.
- After reviewing my previous argument, I shall here extend it in order to plug some loopholes.

Printout filed in "Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 2 (F-N)".

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