|Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz's Law|
|Langford (Simon) & Ramachandran (Murali)|
|Source: Philosophical Quarterly, 2000, Vol. 50 Issue 201, p518, 9p|
|Paper - Abstract|
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Philosophers Index Abstract
Andre Gallois's recent book Occasions of Identity1 attempts to defend the coherence of the view that objects may be identical at one time but distinct at another (the occasional identity2 thesis). The defense requires a special account of rigid designation and a special version of Leibniz's law3. This paper shows Gallois's proposals in this regard to be inadequate, and suggests a better line of defense for occasional identity4 theorists.
Focuses on possible ways of resisting arguments from rigid designation and Leibniz' law5 by occasional identity6 theorists. Attempt of Andre Gallois to defend the occasional identity7 thesis (OIC); Outline of the arguments; Alternative defense of OIC.
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