Philosophers Index Abstract
- The aim is to elucidate Austin's conception of an "illocutionary act." In the case of some illocutionary acts which are not essentially conventional it is shown that a concept of communication-intention due to H. P. Grice can be used to explain why the illocutionary act has some of the features attributed to it by Austin, in particular that of being "meant to be made explicit" by means of a performative formula.
- The resulting cannot be generalized to cover all cases of illocutionary acts, for it does not fit the essentially conventional illocutionary acts which were austin's starting-point. Some common, and some distinguishing, features of these contrasted types of case are set out, and a caution is added against supposing that there are just two clearly exclusive and exhaustive types of case.
- This article performs the historically important function of bringing together Grice's original work on (speaker) meaning and Austin's work on illocutionary acts.
- The first few sections thus function as a concise and sophisticated review of the Grice and Austin selections.
- Strawson then argues for his influential revision of Grice's characterization of meaning and elaborates on Austin's notion of the role of conventions in speech acts.
Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".
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