Three Kinds of Realism About Universals
Teichman (Jenny)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly 39.155, Apr. 1989, pp. 143-165
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. The following positions are distinguished:
    1. That both predicables and "property-names" refer to universals1;
    2. That predicables refer to universals2 while "property-names" don't;
    3. That "property-names" refer to universals3 while predicables don't.
  2. Each position is discussed at length and found wanting.
  3. Insofar as the three views are exhaustive of traditional realism about universals4, that too is found wanting; the legitimacy of higher-order quantification, however, remains unassailed.

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