<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_444.htm">Contingent Identity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Gibbard (Allan).htm">Gibbard (Allan)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_444.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperCitings_444.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PapersToNotes_444.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1125.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. This claim is made first through an example. </li><li>The paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</A><SUP>1</SUP> as a consequence. </li><li>This general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. </li><li>It includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>2</SUP>, and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>3</SUP> and dispositional properties. </li><li>The theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, in that it stems naturally from a systematic picture of the physical world.</li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Also in <a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_647.htm">Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity</A>", </li><li>Originally published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1975), pp. 187-221</li><li>Annotated photocopy filed in <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5967.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 06 (F-G)</A>". </li><li>Included in <a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6213.htm">Look (Brandon C.) - The Metaphysics of Material Beings: Constitution, Persistence, and Identity</A>". </li><li>For Notes, see <a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20390.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Gibbard,  Contingent Identity </A>". </li><li>See <a name="W3707W"></a><A HREF = "http://metaphysicist.com/articles/Gibbard_Identity.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li></ul><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P444_4">Write-up</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P444_4"></A></u> (as at 04/04/2015 00:17:17): Gibbard - Contingent Identity</B><BR><br>This note provides my detailed review of <a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>". <BR><BR>Currently, this write-up is only available as a PDF. For a prcis, click <A HREF="../../GibbardContingentIdentity.pdf" TARGET = "_top">File Note (PDF)</A>. It is my intention to convert this to Note format shortly. <BR><BR>& Further details to be <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_742.htm">supplied</A><SUP>5</SUP><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P444_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P444_4"><B>Footnote 4</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (04/04/2015 00:17:17). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1125.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-17T12:05" pubdate>17/08/2018 12:05:41</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>