Possible Worlds
Stalnaker (Robert)
Source: Stalnaker - Ways a World Might Be, Chapter 1
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this Paper


Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This paper explores David Lewis's four theses1 on possible worlds.
  2. It is argued that these constitute a doctrine called extreme realism about possible worlds, which is deemed false.
  3. However, these theses need not be accepted or rejected as a package.
  4. The independence of the more plausible parts of the package is shown to defend the coherence of a more moderate form of realism about possible worlds, one that may be justified by common modal opinions and defended as a foundation for a theory about the activities of rational agents.

Comment:



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Stalnaker gives these as:-

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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