<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hitchcock (Christopher) - Probabilistic Causation (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_519.htm">Probabilistic Causation</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hitchcock (Christopher).htm">Hitchcock (Christopher)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 1997-2018</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_519.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PapersToNotes_519.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li> Probabilistic <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation </A><SUP>1</SUP> designates a group of theories that aim to characterize the relationship between cause and effect using the tools of probability theory. The central idea behind these theories is that causes change the probabilities of their effects. This article traces developments in probabilistic <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>2</SUP>, including recent developments in causal modeling. A variety of issues within, and objections to, probabilistic theories of <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>3</SUP> will also be discussed.</li><li>This entry surveys the main approaches to characterizing <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>4</SUP> in terms of probability. <ul type="disc"><li>Section 1 provides some of the motivation for probabilistic approaches to <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>5</SUP>, and addresses a few preliminary issues. </li><li>Section 2 surveys theories that aim to characterize <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>6</SUP> in terms of probability-raising. </li><li>Section 3 surveys developments in causal modeling. Some of the more technical details have been relegated to the supplements. </li><li>Additional probabilistic approaches to <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>7</SUP> are surveyed in Section 4 and in the supplements. </li></ul> </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Contents</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Motivation and Preliminaries<BR>&rarr; 1.1 Problems for Regularity Theories<BR>&rarr; 1.2 Probability<BR>&rarr; 1.3 Causal Relata<BR>&rarr; 1.4 The Interpretation of Probability</li><li>Probability-raising Theories of <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>8</SUP><BR>&rarr; 2.1 Probability-raising and Conditional Probability<BR>&rarr; 2.2 Screening off<BR>&rarr; 2.3 The Common Cause Principle<BR>&rarr; 2.4 The Fork Asymmetry<BR>&rarr; 2.5 Simpson's Paradox and Background Contexts<BR>&rarr; 2.6 Other Causal Relations<BR>&rarr; 2.7 Population-relativity<BR>&rarr; 2.8 Contextual-unanimity<BR>&rarr; 2.9 Path-specific <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>9</SUP><BR>&rarr; 2.10 Potential Counterexamples<BR>&rarr; 2.11 Singular and General <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>10</SUP></li><li>Causal Modeling<BR>&rarr; 3.1 Causal Models<BR>&rarr; 3.2 The Markov Condition<BR>&rarr; 3.3 The Causal Markov Condition<BR>&rarr; 3.4 The Minimality and Faithfulness Conditions<BR>&rarr; 3.5 Unshielded Colliders and Asymmetry<BR>&rarr; 3.6 Intervention<BR>&rarr; 3.7 Statistical Distinguishability and Reduction</li><li>Other Theories<BR>&rarr; 4.1 Counterfactual Theories<BR>&rarr; 4.2 The Canberra Plan<BR>&rarr; 4.3 Interventionist Theories<BR>&rarr; 4.4 Singular <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>11</SUP> and the Evolution of Probabilities in Time<BR>Bibliography<BR>Other Internet Resources<BR>Related Entries</li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Supplements</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Suppes' Motivation for the No-screening-off Condition</li><li>Common Confusions Involving the Common Cause Principle</li><li>The Fork Asymmetry and the Second Law of Thermodynamics</li><li>Contextual-unanimity and Dupr's Critique</li><li>The Markov Condition</li><li>Three Results Concerning Statistical Distinguishability</li><li>Singular <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>12</SUP> and the Evolution of Probabilities in Time</li><li>Notes to Probabilistic <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>13</SUP> </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>First published Fri Jul 11, 1997; substantive revision Sun Mar 21, 2010; see <a name="W280W"></a><A HREF = "https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/causation-probabilistic/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li><li>Substantive revision Fri Mar 9, 2018; see <a name="W6686W"></a><A HREF = "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li></ul><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T05:33" pubdate>02/08/2018 05:33:57</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>