|Reason and Agency|
|Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1997; 97: 263-280|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Notes Citing this Paper||Link to Latest Write-Up Note|
Philosophers Index Abstract
A motivation-based conception of human action, found in Hobbes or Davidson, characterizes action as something motivated by psychological attitudes that make it purposive or goal-directed. A practical reason-based conception, found in Aquinas or Kant, characterizes human action as the exercise of a capacity to apply (or misapply) a distinctively practical reason. Only the practical reason-based conception is consistent with the extension accorded 'is an intentional action' by common sense psychology. Despite this, the motivation-based conception gained ground from the early modern period onwards, supported by new developments in the theory of human rationality.
For a précis, see this Note1.
Write-up2 (as at 01/08/2017 23:09:36): Pink - Reason and Agency
This note provides my detailed review of "Pink (Thomas) - Reason and Agency".
Currently, this write-up is only available as a PDF. For a précis, click File Note (PDF). It is my intention to convert this to Note format in due course.
I also have a Talk, delivered to a discussion group, effectively a cut-down version of the original Write-Up.
→ Further details to be supplied3.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - December 2017.||Please address any comments on this page to email@example.com.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|