Reason and Agency
Pink (Thomas)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1997; 97: 263-280
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    A motivation-based conception of human action, found in Hobbes or Davidson, characterizes action as something motivated by psychological attitudes that make it purposive or goal-directed. A practical reason-based conception, found in Aquinas or Kant, characterizes human action as the exercise of a capacity to apply (or misapply) a distinctively practical reason. Only the practical reason-based conception is consistent with the extension accorded 'is an intentional action' by common sense psychology. Despite this, the motivation-based conception gained ground from the early modern period onwards, supported by new developments in the theory of human rationality.

Comment:

For a précis, see this Note1.


Write-up2 (as at 01/08/2017 23:09:36): Pink - Reason and Agency

This note provides my detailed review of "Pink (Thomas) - Reason and Agency".

Currently, this write-up is only available as a PDF. For a précis, click File Note (PDF). It is my intention to convert this to Note format in due course.

I also have a Talk, delivered to a discussion group, effectively a cut-down version of the original Write-Up.

→ Further details to be supplied3.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (01/08/2017 23:09:36).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.

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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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