The Soul
Quinton (Anthony)
Source: Perry - Personal Identity
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This is an argument for the constructability of an empirical concept of the soul, which, like Locke's, interprets the soul as a sequence of mental states logically distinct from the body and is neutral with regard to the problem of the subject.
  2. The soul is defined as a series of mental states connected by continuity of character and memory.
  3. The objection that a memory criterion presupposes a bodily criterion is considered.
  4. Arguments for it are judged forceful but not conclusive.
  5. Finally, the paper deals with the complex question whether a soul can exist in an entirely disembodied1 state.

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