Lewis, Perry, and What Matters
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Rorty (Amelie) - The Identities of Persons, 1976
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. ‘We can agree with Parfit’, Lewis writes, ‘… that what matters1 in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness … At the same time we can consistently agree with common sense … that what matters2 in questions of personal identity is identity’ (p. 193).
  2. Despite the great resourcefulness of Lewis’s paper, I still believe this cannot be done. I shall first explain why, then suggest what this might show, and end with some remarks about Perry’s paper4.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3: See "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity".

Footnote 4: See "Perry (John) - The Importance of Being Identical".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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