<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Nida-Rumelin (Martine) - Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_564.htm">Qualia: The Knowledge Argument</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/N/Author_Nida-Rumelin (Martine).htm">Nida-Rumelin (Martine)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-9</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_564.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperCitings_564.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><BR><BR>The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical properties. It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being. It is one of the most discussed arguments against physicalism.<ol type="1"><li>Remarks About the History of the Underlying Intuition</li><li>The Basic Idea</li><li>Some Clarifications<BR>& 3.1 Two Versions of the Argument<BR>& 3.2 Physical and Non-physical<BR>& 3.3 Knowing what it is like</li><li>Objections<BR>& 4.1 Doubts about the <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">Thought Experiment</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR>& 4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of all the Physical Facts<BR>& 4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability Hypothesis<BR>& 4.4 Objections Against the Ability Hypothesis<BR>& 4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: the Acquaintance Hypothesis<BR>& 4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact-View<BR>& 4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View<BR>& 4.8 Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact View</li><li>The Dualist View About the Knowledge Argument</li><li>Concluding Remark<BR>Bibliography<BR>Other Internet Resources<BR>Related Entries</li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>First published Tue Sep 3, 2002; substantive revision Mon Nov 23, 2009; <a name="W288W"></a><A HREF = "https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/qualia-knowledge/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T05:34" pubdate>02/08/2018 05:34:43</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>