- Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures used to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness.
- Few people think zombies actually exist. But many hold they are at least conceivable, and some that they are possible. It is argued that if zombies are so much as a bare possibility, then physicalism is false and some kind of dualism is true. For many philosophers that is the chief importance of the zombie idea. But the idea is also of interest for its presuppositions about the nature of consciousness and how the physical and the phenomenal are related. Use of the zombie idea against physicalism also raises more general questions about relations between imaginability, conceivability, and possibility. Finally, zombies raise epistemological difficulties: they reinstate the ‘other minds’ problem.
- The idea of zombies
- Zombies and physicalism
- The conceivability argument
- Are zombies conceivable?
→ 4.1 Arguments for
→ 4.2 Arguments against
- Does conceivability entail possibility?
→ 5.1 Objections based on a posteriori necessity
→ 5.2 The phenomenal concept strategy
→ 5.3 Russellian monism
→ 5.4 Other objections
- Other issues
→ 6.1 Mental causation1
→ 6.2 The function of consciousness
→ 6.3 Other minds
Other internet resources
First published Mon Sep 8, 2003; substantive revision Thu Mar 17, 2011; Link.
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