Narrow Mental Content
Brown (Curtis)
Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-7
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined by the individual's intrinsic properties.

  1. Introduction
  2. Arguments for Broad Content
    … 2.1 Putnam's Argument: Twin Earth and Natural Kinds1
    … 2.2 Burge's Argument: Semantic Deference
    … 2.3 Responses to the Arguments
  3. Arguments for Narrow Content
    … 3.1 Causal Arguments
    … 3.2 Arguments from Introspective Access
    … 3.3 Arguments Concerning Rationality
  4. Conceptions of Narrow Content
    … 4.1 Descriptive Content
    … 4.2 Conceptual Role
    … 4.3 The Mapping Conception
    … 4.4 Diagonal Propositions
    … 4.5 Sets of Maximal Epistemic Possibilities
  5. Strategies for Determining Narrow Content
    … 5.1 Diagonalization Strategy
    … 5.2 Subtraction Strategy
    … 5.3 Ideal Environment Strategy
    … 5.4 Epistemic Strategy
  6. Further Issues
    … 6.1 Type or Token?
    … 6.2 What Sort of Token?
    … 6.3 Holism vs. Particularism
    … 6.4 The Subject
  7. Conclusion
    Bibliography
    Other Internet Resources

Comment:

First published Wed Nov 20, 2002; substantive revision Wed Feb 14, 2007; see Link.

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