|Narrow Mental Content|
|Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2002-7|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Statistics||Notes Citing this Paper||Colour-Conventions||Disclaimer|
Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined by the individual's intrinsic properties.
… 2.1 Putnam's Argument: Twin Earth and Natural Kinds1
… 2.2 Burge's Argument: Semantic Deference
… 2.3 Responses to the Arguments
… 3.1 Causal Arguments
… 3.2 Arguments from Introspective Access
… 3.3 Arguments Concerning Rationality
… 4.1 Descriptive Content
… 4.2 Conceptual Role
… 4.3 The Mapping Conception
… 4.4 Diagonal Propositions
… 4.5 Sets of Maximal Epistemic Possibilities
… 5.1 Diagonalization Strategy
… 5.2 Subtraction Strategy
… 5.3 Ideal Environment Strategy
… 5.4 Epistemic Strategy
… 6.1 Type or Token?
… 6.2 What Sort of Token?
… 6.3 Holism vs. Particularism
… 6.4 The Subject
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First published Wed Nov 20, 2002; substantive revision Wed Feb 14, 2007; see Stanford Archive: Narrow Mental Content.
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