Universals: Bambrough on Wittgenstein
Dilman (Ilham)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1978-1979
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Philosophers Index Abstract

    1) Universals1 as ingredients. Wittgenstein's rejection of the 'common property' thesis. This does not make him a nominalist. 2) An aspect of wittgenstein's attack on essentialism. 'Common property' thesis inspired by mathematics (see "theaetetus" 148) but comes from a misunderstanding of it which ignores its application. In the end the meaning of any term can only be gathered from the particular cases in which it is applicable. 3) Classification and reality. Examination and rejection of bambrough's view that in the end all classification rests on 'objective similarities and differences', presented by nature independently of our language. Wittgenstein did not hold such a view. 4) Kinds and formal categories. We do not start our classifications with 'bare particulars'. We must already speak a language before we can either compare anything or have anything to classify.

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