Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein
Chihara (Charles S.) & Fodor (Jerry)
Source: Fodor - Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This paper explores some lines of argument in Wittgenstein1's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between Wittgenstein2's philosophical psychology, on the one hand, and his philosophy of language, his epistemology, and his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other.
  2. The authors maintain that the later writings of Wittgenstein3 express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism."
  3. They also maintain that there are good grounds for rejecting the philosophical theory implicit in Wittgenstein4's later works. In particular,
    1. they first argue that Wittgenstein5's position leads to some implausible conclusions concerning the nature of language and psychology;
    2. second, they maintain that the arguments Wittgenstein6 provides are inconclusive; and
    3. third, they sketch an alternative position which they believe avoids many of the difficulties implicit in Wittgenstein7's philosophy.

Comment:

Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"

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