Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity
Adams (Robert Merrihew)
Source: Journal of Philosophy. Jan 1979; 76: 5-26
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Is your thisness1, the property of being you, distinct from all purely qualitative properties?
  2. An affirmative answer to this question cannot be established by appeal to the semantics of direct reference, but only by refuting a certain doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles2.
  3. Two types of argument against that doctrine are analyzed and defended in the present essay.
  4. It is further argued that if the identity of indiscernibles3 is false, there must be primitive trans-world identities.
  5. Finally, some attention is given to the question, how there can be necessary connections between primitive thisnesses4 and purely qualitative properties.

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