Mental Properties
Bealer (George)
Source: Journal of Philosophy 91.4, April 1994, pp. 185-208
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    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis--the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument--are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments--the modal1 argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment.

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