Mental Properties |
---|
Bealer (George) |
Source: Journal of Philosophy 91.4, April 1994, pp. 185-208 |
Paper - Abstract |
Paper Statistics | Disclaimer |
Philosophers Index AbstractIt is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis--the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument--are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments--the modal1 argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Feb 2019. | Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. | File output: Website Maintenance Dashboard | Return to Top of this Page | Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page | Return to Theo Todman's Home Page |