A Theory of Aggregates
Burge (Tyler)
Source: Nous 11.2, May 1977, pp. 97-117
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Informal introductions to the mathematical notion of set standardly distinguish that notion from a vague nominalistic counterpart, a notion of aggregate. The latter notion seems worth refining because it is useful in giving semantically intelligible form to some discourse involving plural constructions and mass terms and because it can serve to sharpen certain issues regarding nominalism and set-theoretic realism. The semantical motivation is highlighted in the present version of the paper. A theory is sketched and applied to a number of examples. Emphasis is placed on the difference in the ways that sortal1 predicates and mass-term predicates relate to the individuals of the theory.

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