Simulation Reasoning, Common-sense Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence
Barnden (John A.)
Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 13
Paper - Abstract

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Editors’ Abstract1

  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. John Barnden's 'Simulative Reasoning, Common-sense Psychology and Artificial Intelligence3' (chapter 13) shows how work in artificial intelligence4, on simulative reasoning versus meta-reasoning, is closely related to the mental simulation debate, despite having a different initial motivation.
  3. He expounds a simulative reasoning system, and goes on to argue that the simulation approach is more efficient than the meta-reasoning (theory theory) approach.
  4. Furthermore, he explains how the simulative approach can deal with the control problem of when and why one should use a given rule of inference.
  5. It is also interesting to note that Barnden claims that his system can deal with nested simulations, whereas "Leslie (Alan M.) & German (Tim P.) - Knowledge and Ability in 'Theory of Mind': One-eyed Overview of a Debate" (p. 130) claims that these pose a major problem for the simulation theory.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2021
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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