|Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol IV) - Metaphysics|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Text Colour-Conventions|
Philosophers Index Abstract
The issue between nominalists and realists is unlikely ever to be rationally resolved. Currently favoured tests, leaning on the notions of reference and identity, do not yield a clear-cut way of resolving the issue. There is no neutral vantage-point from which to determine whether the notion of existence should be restricted to what is found in nature or should be extended to include objects of thought exemplifiable but not locatable in nature.
The existence of universals1 (general properties or kinds) is disputed because of fears of myth-making, and argued against on the grounds that they are dispensable as objects of reference and that they lack general principles of identity. Ripostes: they are unavoidable as objects of thought, and each, as essence, is its own individual principle of identity. The fundamental ground of the continuing dispute is the strong human disposition to believe that to exist at all is to exist as an object in time in the natural world; whereas universals2 are abstract objects of thought, exemplified in the natural world and related inter se by conceptual necessities.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - June 2018.||Please address any comments on this page to firstname.lastname@example.org.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|