<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1091.htm">On What There Is</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">Quine (W.V.)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1091.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperCitings_1091.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PapersToNotes_1091.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Frazer MacBride s Notes on W.V.O. Quine "On What There Is"</U> (MPhil Stud Seminar, Birkbeck, 3rd October 2005) <FONT COLOR = "800080"><BR><BR><B>Fundamental Point</B>: "To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.... We are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true" (OWI: 13).<BR><BR><B>Structure of paper</B> <ol type="1"><li><B>Plato's Beard</B> unsatisfactory responses to the Puzzle of Non-Being (OWI: 1-5)</li><li><B>Untangling the Beard</B> using Russell's Theory of Descriptions (OWI: 5-9)</li><li><B>The Problem of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>1</SUP></B> there are no <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> (OWI: 9-15)</li><li><B>Ontological Methodology</B> how to adjudicate between rival ontologies (OWI: 15-19) </li></ol><B>Analysis</B> <ol type="1"><li><B>Plato's Beard</B>: Does Pegasus exist? If he doesn't then what am I denying the existence of? <ul type="disc"><li>a) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1091_3">McX</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1091_3"></A> identifies Pegasus with a mental idea but Pegasus no more an idea than the Parthenon.</li><li>b) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1091_4">Wyman</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1091_4"></A> identifies Pegasus with an un-actualised possibility but such entities are unduly mysterious and there also non-existent things which could not exist (e.g. the round square cupola). </li></ul></li><li><B>Untangling the Beard</B><BR>There's no necessity to admit non-existent objects because <ul type="disc"><li>(c) Russell's theory of descriptions and </li><li>(d) Frege's distinction between sense and reference </li></ul>show that <I>being meaningful</I> and <I>naming</I> are different things.<ul type="disc">(<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1091_5">TD</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1091_5"></A>): The F Gs &harr; (&exist;xFx & (&forall;yFy &rarr; x=y)) & Gx </ul></li><li><B>The Problem of <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>6</SUP></B><BR>There is no need to admit mysterious entities like <I>being red</I> any more than non-existent things like Pegasus because <ul type="disc"><li>(e) the semantic role of a predicate is simply to be true or false of an entity picked out by a name, </li><li>(f) expressions can be meaningful without there being meanings and </li><li>(g) we do not quantify over predicate expressions.</li></ul>Clarifying ontological commitment by comparison with philosophy of mathematics: <ul type="disc"><I>realism logicism, conceptualism intuitionism, nominalism formalism</I>.</ul></li><li> <B>Ontological Methodology</B><BR>A criterion of ontological commitment does not tell us what there is, but what someone says there is; whether we accept what someone says is guided by the general ideals of theory construction; a choice of ontology is determined by the over-all conceptual scheme that accommodates science in the broadest sense.</li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Required reading for Birkbeck MPhil Stud Seminar 03/10/2005; Also in:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>",</li><li><a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>", </li><li><a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_424.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings</A>", </li><li><a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", and </li><li><a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_17.htm">Linsky (Leonard), Ed. - Semantics and the Philosophy of Language - A Collection of Readings</A>"</li></ul>Photocopy filed in <a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4082.htm">Various - Heythrop Essays & Supporting Material (Boxes)</A>". Note - see <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20391.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  On What There Is </A>".<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P1091_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1091_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: TT: Presumably McTaggart. <a name="On-Page_Link_P1091_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1091_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: TT: Presumably Meinong.<a name="On-Page_Link_P1091_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1091_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <B>TD</B> =  (Russell s) <B>T</B>heory of <B>D</B>escriptions. For helpful HTML tags for logical connectives, see <a name="W1168W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T05:41" pubdate>02/08/2018 05:41:16</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>