Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints
McCann (Hugh J.)
Source: Mele - The Philosophy of Action - Oxford Readings
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This is a defense of the so-called "Simple View" of intentional action: the principle that anyone who A's intentionally intends to A. Rejecting this principle, it is argued, forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of intention: that of providing settled objectives to guide deliberation and action. This is likely either to multiply entities, or to invite a revival of reductionist theories of intention. It also drives a wedge between intention and practical rationality, by forbidding agents to intend goals it is rational to seek. Finally, the states that are "substituted" for intention turn out to be subject to the same rational constraints as intention itself, and hence indistinguishable from it after all. Thus there is no basis for such supposed distinctions, and the simple view1 is to be preferred.

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