Desire As Belief II
Lewis (David)
Source: Lewis - Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. An anti-Humean theory of desire could take either of two forms. It might hold that there are certain things which we desire by necessity. Or it might instead identify desires with certain beliefs – as it might be, with beliefs about what is good.
  2. In a previous article1, I showed that the simplest version of the Desire as Belief theory collapsed into triviality or contradiction.
  3. In this sequel, I show that two other versions are equivalent to Desire by Necessity.

Author’s Conclusion
  1. We have examined four theories that sought to implement the anti-Humean idea that desires and beliefs are necessarily aligned.
    1. One collapses into either triviality or contradiction.
    2. Two more collapse into Desire by Necessity a form of anti-Humeanism, sure enough, but not the right form of anti-Humeanism.
    3. Another is not really anti-Humean at all.
  2. We could keep trying, but the prospects of success have begun to look dim.

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: "Lewis (David) - Desire As Belief".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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