|Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction|
|Source: Kim - Supervenience and Mind|
|Paper - Abstract|
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Philosophers Index Abstract
This paper examines the metaphysical implications of the claim that a property is "multiply realizable" by a set of other properties. A new argument is offered against taking such a property to be a disjunction1 of its realizers. Various causal considerations are advanced for the thesis that a multiply realizable property lacks unity as a nomic property and becomes fragmented into its realizing properties. Finally, the ontological status of multiply realizable properties is discussed. Throughout, various issues concerning the functionalist conception of mental properties are discussed.
See "Fodor (Jerry) - Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years (A Reply to Jaegwon Kim's 'Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction')" for a review.
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