|Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism|
|Source: Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions|
|Paper - Abstract|
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David Lewis develops something like an antinomy concerning change which he calls “the problem of temporary intrinsics”1. The resolution of this puzzle provides his primary motivation for the acceptance of a metaphysics of temporal parts. Lewis’s own discussion is extremely compressed, showing up as a digression in a book about modality2. So I shall set forth in some detail what I take to be his line of reasoning before suggesting that, at least for those philosophers who take seriously the distinction between past, present, and future, the argument poses no special threat.
Also - with an extensive Postscript (2005; "Zimmerman (Dean) - Can One “Take Tense Seriously” and Be a B-theorist?") in "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings".
Footnote 3: This Postcript – and the following sections – was added to make up the version in "Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne), Eds. - Persistence : Contemporary Readings", which is consequently much longer than that in "Van Inwagen (Peter) & Zimmerman (Dean) - Metaphysics: The Big Questions".
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