Relative Identity
Noonan (Harold)
Source: Hale & Wright - A Companion to the Philosophy of Language
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction (Full Text)

  1. I shall first set out Geach's views under six headings:
    • (1) the non-existence of absolute identity,
    • (2) the sortal5 relativity of identity,
    • (3) the derelativization thesis,
    • (4) the counting thesis,
    • (5) the thesis of the irreducibility of restricted quantification and
    • (6) the name 'for' an A / name 'of’ an A distinction.
  2. I shall then look at the main arguments given by Geach and his opponents with regard to (1), (2) and (3), which are the core of his position. I begin with thesis (1).

Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. The Non-existence of Absolute Identity
  3. The Sortal6 Relativity of Identity
  4. The Derelativization Thesis
  5. The Counting Thesis
  6. The Irreducibility of Restricted Quantification
  7. The ‘Name for A’ / ‘Name of A’ Distinction
  8. Geach Versus Quine: A Baroque Meinongian Ontology
  9. Cats, Rivers and Heralds
  10. Substantival Terms and the Derelativization Thesis

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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