Ways Worlds Could Be
Forrest (Peter)
Source: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper proposes that suitable uninstantiated properties can be used as replacement for merely possible worlds, in a theory of modality1. It discusses the operations on properties required if we are to have enough structural properties to provide a satisfactory theory. And it argues that the theory so obtained conserves more of our modal2 intuitions than its rivals, in particular than david lewis's realism about possible worlds.

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