Another Look at Bare Particulars
Allaire (Edwin B.)
Source: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. The article goes into Vere Chappell's position that the "correct" solution to the "spurious" individuation1 problem does not require bare particulars2.
  2. The author notes that Chappell tries to solve the individuation3 problem by making relations individuate.
  3. In objecting to this view he calls on an argument of Bertrand Russell for support which holds that relation "presuppose" numerical difference, not account for it.
  4. He further argues that the belief that relations individuate derives from confusing numerical difference with qualitative difference.
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