Endurance and Indiscernibility
Merricks (Trenton)
Source: Journal of Philosophy, vol. xci (1994) pp. 165–184
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    Mark persists from yesterday to today, the endurantist1 claims, if and only if Mark of yesterday "is identical with" Mark of today. A clear understanding of endurance, it is argued, requires a semantics for expressions like Mark of yesterday' and, generally, O at t.' I argue that once these expressions are properly understood, we can conclude that the familiar objection that endurance violates the indiscernibility of identicals2 is misguided. The analysis of expressions like 'O at t' also provides the resources for an account of what it is for an object to be "wholly present" at a time.

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