Notes
- At the time of writing, I don’t know what Burke’s theory is, but his Introduction is an excellent summary of the alternatives as at the time he was writing, so is worth reproducing in full and commenting on.
- His references are also worth recording.
- My comments are outstanding ….
Philosophers Index Abstract
- This article presents a novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals1, and persistence conditions2.
- Among its advantages over the standard account is its compatibility with the commonsense principle of one material object to a place.
- The account enables us to dispose of the full range of putative counterexamples to that principle, including, notably, that of persons and their bodies.
- And it enables us to do so without resorting to anti-essentialism, temporal parts, sortal3 relativism, temporal relativism, mereological essentialism, or other theories that conflict with our ordinary ways of thinking about the world.
Author’s Introduction
- It is common for the whole of one object and the whole of another to occupy just the same place at just the same time. So say many identity theorists, partly on the basis of reasoning such as this:
- Before us lies a copper statue. In just the same place, presumably, there is some copper and a piece of copper. Now what are the relations among the statue, the copper, and the piece of copper? They can't all be the same one thing, since they differ in their persistence conditions. Suppose that tomorrow we are going to hammer the statue flat and then break what remains into bits. Both the copper and the piece of copper, but not the statue, will survive the flattening. And the copper, but not the piece of copper, will survive the subsequent shattering. So before us there are three objects occupying just the same place. Or if the copper is not an object, there are two such objects: the statue and the piece of copper. Of course, it is only because the statue and the piece of copper consist of the same particles of matter that they are able to occupy the same place.
- Supporters of such reasoning propose that the commonsense principle of one material object to a place be restricted so as to apply only to objects of the same sort. They would allow place-sharing by a statue and a piece of copper, although not by two statues or by two pieces of copper. Let's reserve the term 'coincidence' and its cognates for cases in which the whole of one object wholly occupies the place wholly and simultaneously occupied by the whole of another. Note that as here defined, 'coincidence' denotes an irreflexive relationship. We will use 'coextension' and its cognates for the corresponding reflexive relationship.
- The idea that material objects commonly coincide with others is widely Accepted4. Indeed, it is a corollary of what may be considered the standard account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions. But to many the idea seems preposterous5. And I (1992) have argued that the idea is incoherent. Presumably, those who accept coincidence do so only because they see no congenial way to avoid it. In this paper, I will present and defend a novel alternative to the standard account, one which dispenses with coinciding objects and which may prove more widely agreeable than the other ways of preserving the principle of one object to a place. A quick look at those other ways, followed by a preview of what lies ahead, will take up the remainder of this introductory section.
- One way we could avoid coincidence in the statue case is by denying that statues are essentially statues. We could say that there is before us but a single object, one which at present is both a piece of copper and a statue and which after tomorrow's flattening will remain a piece of copper but no longer be a statue. Thus today's statue will continue to exist after ceasing to be a statue, just as prime ministers often continue to exist after ceasing to be prime ministers. There are two drawbacks to this solution. One is simply that many of us are unwilling to allow that a work of art (or a functional artifact, such as a car) would survive a flattening. The other drawback is that the solution is inapplicable to certain other putative cases of coincidence, such as that of Tibbles the cat. (Tibbles is discussed in Section VI.) In such a case, in which one of the putatively coinciding objects is initially a large proper part of the other, what would help would be some basis for ruling that at least one of the objects ceases to exist. What would be no help at all would be a ruling that some seemingly essential property actually is accidental. That might prolong a career; it could not foreshorten one.
- Some theorists have sought to avoid coincidence by invoking the doctrine that material objects have temporal as well as spatial parts6. On this doctrine, it is not the whole of the piece of copper, but at most a part of it, a temporal part, that is present during any period shorter than the entire period throughout which the piece of copper exists. The relation between the piece of copper and the shorter-careered statue is like the relation between a pipe and its bowl. The bowl is a spatial part of the pipe; the statue is a temporal part of the piece of copper. In both cases it is only a part of the second object, not the whole of it, that is coextensive with the first object. And because the part in question is numerically identical with the object with which it is coextensive, coincidence is avoided. For genuine coincidence it would be necessary for different objects to occupy the same place at every time at which either exists.
- The insufficiency of the temporal-parts solution emerges when we notice that there indeed are putative cases of career-long place-sharing. Such a case is described by Allan Gibbard (1975). A clay statue was brought into being by the conjoining of separately fashioned halves and will be destroyed by being broken into bits. The statue is spatially and temporally congruent with the piece of clay that was thereby brought into being and will thereby be destroyed. Even so, it can be argued that the statue and the piece of clay are diverse: It seems true of the piece of clay, but not of the statue, that it could survive being hammered flat. To block this argument it would be necessary to supplement the already heavy baggage of temporal parts with some such device as the rejection of de re modal properties (this is Gibbard's choice), the claim that the property denoted by a modal predicate varies with the sense of the subject to which it is attached (Noonan 1985, 202-6), the claim that objects have their size and shape essentially (Heller 1990, 53-55), or a doctrine of modal parts (Schlesinger 1985).
- The need for such supplements substantially diminishes the appeal of the temporal-parts solution. Furthermore, the doctrine of temporal parts is at odds with our ordinary ways of thinking. This creates a presumption against the doctrine that could be overcome only by showing that there are problems for whose solution the doctrine is required. My aim is to show that putative cases of coincidence do not constitute such a problem.
- Yet another way to avoid coincidence is to hold, with Geach (1967), that it is common for objects to be numerically identical relative to one sortal but numerically diverse relative to another. With regard to our statue case, the sortal relativist might say something like this. The statue here now and the piece of copper here now are identical relative to all sortals and, in that sense, are absolutely the same one object. Will this one object still exist after tomorrow's hammering? Relative to the sortal 'piece of copper', the answer is yes. But relative to the sortal 'statue', the answer is no. Tomorrow there will be an object spatiotemporally continuous with today's object, but tomorrow's object is neither absolutely identical with today's object nor absolutely diverse from it.
- Another form of relativism, one advocated by Myro (1985) and suggested by Stalnaker (1986), makes numerical identity relative to time. On this theory, our statue is presently identical with the piece of copper; so we have before us just one object. Will this object survive tomorrow's hammering? The answer of the temporal relativist is that the hammering will destroy the statue, but not the piece of copper with which the statue is temporarily identical.
- Most of us, I believe, find these relativist theories uncongenial, if not unacceptable. I will show how we can comfortably avoid coincidence without surrendering the absoluteness of identity.
- Now the statue case is but one of several commonly cited as examples of coincidence. The others feature such pairs as a person and his or her body, a tree and the aggregate of the molecules of which it is composed, and a tailless cat and its "puss" (that part of a normal cat which consists of all of the cat but the tail). Probably it is the latter case, the case of Tibbles the cat, that lately has received the most attention. In seeking a way to avoid coincidence we will want to be mindful of the entire range of putative cases. Some philosophers have paid a steep price to avoid coincidence in one type of case, evidently without noticing that their costly solution is inapplicable to cases of other types. Following a discussion of the Tibbles case, William Carter (1983) reluctantly recommends consideration of the doctrine of mereological essentialism. But that radical doctrine would be unhelpful in cases such as that of the statue, in which the spectre of coincidence arises from something other than the loss or gain of a part. Peter van Inwagen (1981), who also focuses exclusively on Tibbles-type cases, avoids both coincidence and mereological essentialism by the expedient of denying that there are such things as undetached legs, tails, and pusses. But this desperate move contributes nothing to the handling of cases not involving the loss or gain of a part.
- In Section II of this paper, I will show how we can dispense with coincidence in the statue case without resorting to temporal parts, sortal relativism, temporal relativism, mereological essentialism, a denial of the essentiality of statuehood, or any other theory that conflicts with our ordinary ways of thinking.
- In Section III, I will challenge the arguments in support of the standard account of the relations among objects, sortals, and persistence conditions, an account on which coincidence is unavoidable.
- In sections IV and V, I will outline and defend an alternative to the standard account, an alternative that will accommodate Section II’s treatment of the statue case.
- In Section VI, I will show how the alternative account enables us to dispose of other putative cases of coincidence, including, notably, the case of persons and their bodies.
Philosophers Index Abstract
- "Burge (Tyler) - A Theory of Aggregates", 1977
- "Burke (Michael) - Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence", 1980
- "Burke (Michael) - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account", 1992
- "Carter (William) - In Defense of Undetached Parts", 1983.
- "Cartwright (Richard) - Scattered Objects", 1987
- "Chappell (Vere) - Locke on the Ontology of Matter, Living Things and Persons", 1990
- "Chisholm (Roderick) - Parts As Essential To Their Wholes", 1973
- "Doepke (Frederick) - Spatially Coinciding Objects", 1982
- Frederick Doepke 1987. "The Structures of Persons and Artifacts." Ratio 29: 36-52.
- "Feldman (Fred) - Sortal Predicates", 1973
- "Forbes (Graeme) - Is There a Problem About Persistence?", 1987
- "Geach (Peter) - Identity", 1967
- "Geach (Peter) - Reference and Generality", 1980
- "Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity", 1975
- "Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter", 1990
- "Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity", 1982
- John Hooker. 1978. "Why Essentialism is True." Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9: 7-14.
- "Johnston (Mark) - Constitution is Not Identity", 1992
- "Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity", 1971
- "Laycock (H.) - Some Questions of Ontology", 1972
- "Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds", 1986
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Instantiation, Identity and Constitution", 1983
- "Lowe (E.J.) - What Is a Criterion Of Identity?", 1989.
- "Myro (George) - Identity and Time", 1985
- "Noonan (Harold) - The Closest Continuer Theory of Identity", 1985
- "Noonan (Harold) - Reply to Lowe on Ships and Structures", 1988
- John L. Pollock. 1974. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- "Salmon (Nathan) - Reference and Essence", 1981
- "Schlesinger (George N.) - Spatial, Temporal and Cosmic Parts", 1985
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity", 1984
- "Shorter (J.M.) - On Coinciding in Space and Time", 1977
- "Sidelle (Alan) - Necessity, Essence, and Individuation", 1989
- "Simons (Peter) - Parts: A Study in Ontology", 1987
- "Stalnaker (Robert) - Counterparts and Identity", 1986
- "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Parthood and Identity Across Time", 1983
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts", 1981
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings", 1990
- "Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity", 1967
- "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time", 1968
- "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance", 1980
- "Yablo (Stephen) - Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility", 1987
Comment:
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 4:
- Among those prepared to accept coincidence are Chappell (1990), Chisholm (1973, 587-91), Doepke (1982), Forbes (1987, 142-44), Hirsch (1982), Johnston (1992), Kripke (1971, 163-64, fn. 19), Lowe (1983), Pollock (1974, 157-66), Salmon (1981, 224-29), Shorter (1977, 399), Simons (1987, 212-15, 221-24), Thomson (1983), Yablo (1987), and, most influentially, Wiggins (1967, Part One; 1968; 1980, chap. 1).
Footnote 5:
- Peter van Inwagen calls it a "desperate expedient" (1981, 129). Harold Noonan says that it "manifests a bad case of double vision" (1988, 222). David Lewis, speaking of the idea that plastic dishpans coincide with dishpan-shaped pieces of plastic, writes, "This multiplication of entities is absurd on its face" (1986, 252).
Footnote 6:
- See Cartwright 1987, 168-70 and Heller 1990, 19.
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