Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Amongst Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions
Burke (Michael)
Source: Rea - Material Constitution - A Reader
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This article presents a novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals1, and persistence conditions2. Among its advantages over the standard account is its compatibility with the commonsense principle of one material object to a place. The account enables us to dispose of the full range of putative counterexamples to that principle, including, notably, that of persons and their bodies. And it enables us to do so without resorting to anti- essentialism, temporal parts, sortal3 relativism, temporal relativism, mereological essentialism, or other theories that conflict with our ordinary ways of thinking about the world.


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