The Mind-Body Problem After Fifty Years
Kim (Jaegwon)
Source: O'Hear - Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper reviews the debate over the mind-body problem since the Feigl-Smart mind-body identity theory and its current status. Three concepts that have played a key role in this debate are identified: supervenience1, realization, and emergence. It is argued that the classic Nagel model of reduction, with its "bridge laws," is inappropriate for discussion of mind-body reductionism, and that a functional model of reduction should replace it. Phenomenal experiences, or qualia, emerge as the leading candidate as functionally irreducible, emergent properties and it is argued that this makes the problem of mental causation2 insoluble for such properties. Consciousness and mental causation3, therefore, are the two ingredients of the mind-body problem that make the problem intractable, perhaps insoluble.

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