Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-Examination
Allison (Henry)
Source: Tipton - Locke on Human Understanding - Selected Essays
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    The author's thesis is that although Locke's theory of personal identity is wrong, it merits more examination than has been given. Locke's theory must be considered within the framework Locke gave, i.e., a general analysis of the concept of identity, particularly that of thinking substance. Locke attempts to ground personal identity in consciousness or memory; this was soon attacked by such philosophers as Hume and Leibniz. Locke's main contribution consists of his separation of the concept of the unity of consciousness1, which he equated with personal identity, from the metaphysical doctrine of the identity of an immaterial substance. This raised the issue of personal identity as a distinct philosophical problem for the first time. (Staff)

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Nov 2020. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page