Morals and Modals
Blackburn (Simon)
Source: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper displays a "quasi-realist" theory of necessary truths, in which our propensity to attach modal1 values to propositions is compared with our propensity to moral attitudes. The theory offers an alternative to quinean scepticism to 'as if' theories, and to modal2 realism.

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