Philosophers Index Abstract
- This paper presents an account of racism as an insufficiency of good will, often constituting ill will.
- I contend this reflects contemporary usage of the term, especially its primary employment as both descriptive and evaluative. I also sketch some of this view's implications for the morality of some forms of race-sensitive discrimination in private and public life.
- Finally, I note some of this account's advantages over more familiar conceptions of racism – as a doctrine, as a socioeconomic system of oppression, or as a form of action.
- One feature of this approach is it presents racism as morally vicious and applies to a topic in social philosophy – points made in recent criticisms of modernist moral theory offered by proponents of virtues-based moral theory.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)