Personal Identity and Brain Transplants
Snowdon (Paul)
Source: Cockburn - Human Beings, 1991
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Can animalism1 – the thesis that we are identical with animals and have their persistence conditions – reply to an objection claiming that brain transplants2 reveal the identity does not hold?
  2. The objection is analysed into four premises and the interim conclusion is that each is plausible.
  3. A line of reply, by K. Wilkes and M. Johnston, opposing the method of the objection is criticized as unsupported.
  4. The conclusion is that the best reply to the objection is to deny an intuition on which one premise relies. Whether this reply is ultimately sustainable is one very important current issue about personal identity.

  1. Introduction;
  2. Animalism3 and an Objection;
  3. The Objection and some Responses;
  4. The ‘Possibility’ of Brain Transplants4;
  5. Criticism of Method;
  6. Wilkes’s Criticism;
  7. Johnston’s Criticism;
  8. An Alternative Reply;
  9. Conclusion


Annotated photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 17 (S2: Sm+)".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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