Imagination and the Sense of Identity
Hertzberg (Lars)
Source: Cockburn - Human Beings
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The assumption that we can establish philosophical conclusions about personal identity by asking what things about a person could have been imagined different from what they are is criticized. The question 'Can this be imagined?' cannot be addressed in the abstract; the answer to it depends on the context in which it is raised. Attempts to explore the concept of identity by appealing to thought experiments1, though distinct from appeals to the imagination, are also confused, since they presuppose a definite answer to the question what would constitute using words with the same meaning in radically different circumstances.

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