Feminism in Philosophy of Mind: The Question of Personal Identity
James (Susan)
Source: Fricker & Hornsby - The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Philosophers Index Abstract

    This article focuses on the work of those theorists of personal identity who assume a division between mind and body, and on the thought experiments1 they employ, in the light of the fact that the mind/body opposition carries connotations of gender. It shows that some standard types of thought experiment2 implicitly present bodily traits as marginal to character, to the operation of memory and to other familiar aspects of the self. It argues that theories which rely on such thought experiments3 unselfconsciously articulate a masculine conception of personal identity.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page