Descartes: The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness
Wilson (Margaret)
Source: Cottingham - Descartes - Oxford Readings
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Descartes's replies to Caterus and Arnauld provide clues to a stronger interpretation of his principal argument for dualism.
  2. One of Descartes's key premisses, I claim, is that he can clearly and distinctly conceive himself as a complete thing, merely in conceiving himself as thinking (not attributing to himself extension); and conversely, that he can clearly and distinctly conceive body as a complete thing merely in conceiving it as extended.
  3. These points are mainly established in the second meditation, through the cogito reasoning and the piece of wax; however, the final conclusion must wait till the sixth, since it requires vindication of clear and distinct ideas.

Comment:


Write-up2 (as at 02/08/2017 19:12:00): Wilson - Descartes's Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness

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