- Specific and numerical identity represent repetition of bound predicative and individual variables, respectively.
- Reflection, like derelativization, can operate in any category, and itself transcends the categories.
- Davidson's justification of talk of identity of events: his examples, on examination, prove not to involve the concept of identity at all.
- A better example found, and its logical form exposed.
- Preliminary explanation of the notion of a definite description of an event.
- Failure of Davidson's attempt to cast all designations of events into definite description form.
- Definite descriptions of events contrasted with direct nominalizations of event-reporting sentences. Direct and indirect designation.
- Direct nominalizations compared with Kripke's 'rigid designators'.
- Where Kripke rejects the claim of Mind-Brain Identity Theorists that their favourite propositions are, as they maintain, contingent, we regard the sentences themselves as 'pseudo-propositions'.
- It will not help the Identity Theorists to regard events as objects and identity as a relation along the lines of our 'Eirenic Interlude'.
- What the identity proposition says must be capable of being shown by repetition of some element in a proposition. This requirement cannot be satisfied by the Identity Theorists.
- If they can explain their view without expressing it in terms of identity, it may after all be acceptable.
Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 19 (W)".
Footnote 1: Taken from "Williams (Christopher) - What Is Identity?: Introduction and Analytical Table of Contents". The numbering corresponds to Williams’s section-numbering.
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