The Identity of Events
Williams (Christopher)
Source: Williams (Christopher) - What is Identity? Chapter 8
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryText Colour-Conventions


Analytical TOC1

  1. Specific and numerical identity represent repetition of bound predicative and individual variables, respectively.
  2. Reflection, like derelativization, can operate in any category, and itself transcends the categories.
  3. Davidson's justification of talk of identity of events: his examples, on examination, prove not to involve the concept of identity at all.
  4. A better example found, and its logical form exposed.
  5. Preliminary explanation of the notion of a definite description of an event.
  6. Failure of Davidson's attempt to cast all designations of events into definite description form.
  7. Definite descriptions of events contrasted with direct nominalizations of event-reporting sentences. Direct and indirect designation.
  8. Direct nominalizations compared with Kripke's 'rigid designators'.
  9. Where Kripke rejects the claim of Mind-Brain Identity Theorists that their favourite propositions are, as they maintain, contingent, we regard the sentences themselves as "pseudo- propositions'.
  10. It will not help the Identity Theorists to regard events as objects and identity as a relation along the Hnes of our 'Eirenic Interlude'.
  11. What the identity proposition says must be capable of being shown by repetition of some element in a proposition. This requirement cannot be satisfied by the Identity Theorists.
  12. If they can explain their view without expressing it in terms of identity, it may after all be acceptable.

Comment:

Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 19 (W)".



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Williams (Christopher) - What Is Identity?: Introduction and Analytical Table of Contents". The numbering corresponds to Williams’s section-numbering.


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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