Identity, Being, and Truth
Williams (Christopher)
Source: Williams (Christopher) - What is Identity? Chapter 10
Paper - Abstract

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Analytical TOC1

  1. What we say in ordinary English by using the words 'be', 'same', and 'true' can be said by using quantifiers and variables.
  2. The apparatus of quantifiers and variables involves the concept of reflection as well as derelativization.
  3. Is derelativization as well as reflection required for the expression of identity propositions?
  4. What can be shown and what can be said with respect to identity.
  5. 'Der' needed as well as 'Ref' for the reductive analysis of identity as a relation.
  6. 'Der' and 'Ref' transcend syntactical categories, as do the concepts of being and identity. Truth, on the other hand, can be expressed by 'Der' and 'Ref' only when these are restricted to the category of third-level predicables.
  7. Reflection, thus restricted, is the same as correspondence.
  8. Natural languages, lacking presentences, need pseudo-predicables like "true". Their category of definite descriptions also fails to distinguish third-level predicables like 'What Percy says' from second-level predicables like 'What the postman brought'. This is a further reason for the emergence of the pseudo-predicable 'true'.
  9. Definite descriptions, seeming to name objects, give rise not only to pseudo-properties for these objects, like truth, but also to pseudo-relations between them, like identity.
  10. The point about being, identity, and truth made without benefit of logical symbolism.


Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 19 (W)".

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

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