Is There a Problem About Persistence?
Forbes (Graeme)
Source: Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper responds to the arguments of Mark Johnston (in "Johnston (Mark) - Is There a Problem About Persistence?") in the same symposium that the familiar philosophical debate about identity through time rests on misconceptions. I argue against both Johnston's position and that of David Lewis.
Conclusion
    My conclusion is that the conception of an enduring thing is not something that belongs to a particular theoretical apparatus for analysing tensed discourse about persistents. Rather, it is a conception native to that discourse. The stage-theorist who holds that his ontology is the basic one must therefore show that the language with tenses eliminated by quantifiers over times is primary with respect to tensed language. But the question of what would settle the operator-quantifier contest in this area appears as difficult to me as does its modal1 cousin

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